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  I 
Abstract  
Among the countries involved in the 2011 Arab revolution, Egypt and Tunisia are considered to have 
developed the most. However, Tunisia is the only country recognised as having undergone a 
successful democratic transition, whilst the transition in Egypt has been unstable and not as 
prosperous. This study aims to increase the understanding of the impact women can have on post-
Arab revolution countries’ transition to democracy, by analysing the challenges and opportunities for 
women’s political participation through the lenses of the UN Security Council’s agenda on Women, 
Peace and Security, in mainly Egypt. To receive a comprehensive understanding of the issue, a case 
study is presented, where Egypt constitutes the main case of interest, and Tunisia a comparative 
background case.  
   In order to reach the objective, a two months field study to Egypt was undertaken, where 
interviews with relevant actors were conducted. To deepen the analysis further, this paper also 
includes policy documents, a note written by the Egyptian Ambassador Moushira Khattab on 
UNSCR 1325 and the National Strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030. It 
concludes by providing policy recommendations and by arguing that Egyptian women can 
bring about positive change for the country, if there is a wider and dedicated commitment to 
increase the respect for women’s rights and participation on all levels of decision-making.  
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1. Introduction  
Prior to the 2011 Arab revolution, the situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region was considered stable. The authoritarian rulers of many states had proven to be 
effective in co-opting and containing the opponents of the regimes. Yet, it only took one 
man’s act of desperation to unite the Arab population over their common political identity in 
what came to be the biggest upheaval the region has experienced in modern time (Gause III, 
2011:82-85).  
   Out of the countries involved in the Arab uprisings, there has been a tendency by 
scholars to mainly focus on Egypt and Tunisia. Both countries managed to overthrow their 
president quite soon after the revolution began and have since held at least one democratic 
election. However, Tunisia is the only country recognised as having undergone a 
successful democratic transition, whilst the democratic transition in Egypt has not been as 
prosperous (Kao & Lust, 2017:1-2). The situation in Egypt has been volatile. Besides 
being faced with regional instabilities, the country is also experiencing socio-economic 
and political challenges within its borders (Abdel Ghafar, 2018:7). Consequently, one goal 
proclaimed by the current Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is “to build a more stable 
future" (Middle East Eye and Agencies, 2014).  
   This study is limited to focus on mainly two of Egypt’s proclaimed goals, namely achieving 
democracy and stability. It places itself with the literature arguing that democracy is highly 
resilient and therefore promotes stability. However, in order to reach democracy, it’s 
important to understand the process of democratisation. This study builds on the literature 
arguing that there is a positive relationship between a strong civil society and a positive 
democratic transition. It intends to deepen the understanding of the impact of the civil society 
on the democratisation process by focusing on mainly one aspect, namely women.  
   One aspect of the roles of women is derived from the United Nations Security Council’s 
(UNSC) framework on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). Since the adoption of the WPS 
agenda in 2000, the concept of women as actors of change has been increasingly more 
accepted. The framework, which has a rights-based approach, is built on four pillars and aims 
to promote women’s and girl’s rights, the equal participation and influence of women and 
men in public life, prevent all forms of violence against women and girls and meet the relief 
and recovery needs of women and girls, in conflict and post-conflict situations (Sida, 2015:1-
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2). This study is limited to focus on the first pillar of the WPS agenda, which is the equal 
participation and influence of women and men in peace and security decision-making 
processes.  
   One of the main limitations of the WPS agenda has been the tendency by countries to regard 
the framework as only relevant to countries in active conflict and post-conflict situations (UN 
Women, 2019:21-23). However, this paper opposes this narrow perspective and builds on the 
conviction that the WPS framework should be understood in a broader manner. Hence, its 
mechanisms are valuable for all countries, regardless of it being in the midst of, or emerging 
from, conflict. One of the main aims of the WPS framework is to facilitate stability and 
considering the development in Egypt, this research argues that these provisions also are 
relevant in the Egyptian context.  
      Women in the region have traditionally been marginalised, however, in the revolution 
women played a variety of key roles and their strong involvement resulted in the advancement 
of women’s rights reaching a peak. Yet, only a year after the revolution women were facing 
backlash to the expansion of their rights, causing human rights activists to question the future 
developments (Abu Ras et.al: 2012:22). Prior to the upheavals, Tunisia and Egypt had the 
most progressive perspective on women and women’s rights (World Economic Forum 
2017:21). Yet, the women of both countries still struggle with persistent inequalities and 
discriminatory structures (Abdel Ghafar, 2018:40). Consequently, this raises a couple of 
questions, what are the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation in the 
Arab region and what is needed to facilitate women’s political participation?  
   The WPS agenda has been recognised as one of the most comprehensive frameworks for the 
empowerment and promotion of women and their rights. Consequently, this research argues 
that by looking through the lenses of the framework, it can help shine clarity on some of the 
prominent obstacles and facilitators of women in the political arena in Post-Arab revolution 
countries. It is mainly limited to focus on Egypt, however, to further deepen the 
understanding of the issue, it also includes Tunisia as a comparative background case.  
 
1.1. Aim and Research Question 
This study aims to contribute theoretically by increasing the understanding of the impact 
women can have on post-Arab revolution countries’ transition to democracy by analysing the 
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challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation through the lenses of the 
WPS agenda, in mainly Egypt. This paper will, therefore, aim to answer one general research 
question and a set of more specific ones: 
 
General research question:  
Q. How to understand challenges and opportunities for women in the political arena in post 
Arab-spring countries? 
 
Specific research questions:  
Q1: What are the current challenges to women’s political participation in Egypt?  
Q2: What are the current existing enabling factors for women’s political participation in 
Egypt?  
Q3: What would women like to change to facilitate their political participation in Egypt?  
Q4: What roles do women perceive for themselves in the political arena in Egypt?  
 
In order to answer the research questions, a field study for two months to Cairo, Egypt, was 
conducted and a qualitative method in the form of semi-structured interviews with relevant 
actors was employed. To further deepen the analysis and provide for the authentication of the 
interviews, this paper also includes a set of policy documents, a note written by the Egyptian 
Ambassador Moushira Khattab on UNSCR 1325 and the National Strategy for the 
Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030.  
 
1.2. Outline 
This research is divided into seven main sections. The second chapter aims at giving an 
overview of previous research and an understanding of the WPS framework. This is followed 
by the third section, which aims at explaining the case selection and providing an 
understanding of the cases of Egypt and Tunisia. The fourth chapter presents and discusses 
the methodology, including an evaluation of the method, analytical frameworks, and data 
used to answer the research questions. The subsequent chapter presents the results from the 
collected material, which are in the fifth chapter analysed and discussed. Finally, this research 
ends with a conclusion, where the purpose is to provide answers to the research questions.  
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2. Background and Theoretical Discussion  
This chapter provides background information and a theoretical discussion on previous 
research and the WPS framework. It is divided into six sections, where the first three sections 
aim to discuss previous research on (1) the nexus between democracy and stability, (2) theory 
on democratisation and (3) women in the Arab world. This is followed by three sections 
which intend to (1) introduce the WPS framework and its components, (2) discuss the 
implementation of the WPS agenda, including challenges and gaps, and (3) present a 
literature review on the WPS framework and further clarify where the identified gap is and 
how this research intends to fill this gap.  
 
2.1. The Democracy-Stability Nexus  
This study focuses on the conflict that arose in the MENA region and led to a series of 
demonstrations and protests in the region. It mainly looks at Egypt and uses Tunisia as a 
background case. Tunisia and Egypt share some similarities. Both have a history of secular 
governments, a majority of Sunni Muslims and shared goals of achieving democracy and 
social and economic justice (The Guardian, 2014). Both countries started working on their 
transition to democracy shortly after the revolution had ended, however, Egypt’s transition 
has not been as stable or successful as the one in Tunisia. Consequently, one proclaimed goal 
made by the current Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is “to build a more stable future" 
(Middle East Eye and Agencies, 2014).  
   This study is limited to focus on mainly two of the proclaimed goals of Egypt, namely 
achieving democracy and stability. Political stability is in general considered to be a positive 
and desirable goal and it is in this research explained as the uninterrupted continuation of 
states’ social and political structures and processes, without the risk of the state becoming 
stagnant (Malantowicz, 2017:57). The definition of democracy used in this research is in line 
with the UN General Assembly’s description, which is that “democracy is a universal value 
based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their political, economic, social and 
cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives” (UN, n.d.). 
   The link between democracy and stability has been increasingly more researched. One of 
the most acknowledged scholars researching this was Giovanni Sartori who argued that a 
highly fragmented and polarised party systems promotes instability. He claimed that a high 
   5 
level of fragmentation of the party system reflects a high level of polarisation, i.e. an 
ideological diversity between parties (Sartori, 1976:124-126). This in turn would allow for 
parties to adopt extremist or anti-system sentiments, which would undermine the legitimacy 
of the regime and impede government formation. Consequently, the political system would 
find itself in a state with increased instability (Sartori, 1976:133). Samuel Huntington 
(1986:79) added to this by arguing that “as political participation increases, the complexity, 
autonomy, adaptability and coherence of the society’s political institutions must also increase 
if political stability is to be maintained”. 
      The discussion above is derived from the assumption that democracy promotes instability 
because of the open nature of the democratic regime which allows for fragmentation, 
polarisation and pluralism. However, many researchers contest this standpoint and instead 
argue that democracy promotes stability, rather than impedes it. 
   “Stability, long-lasting stability, is based on democracy” (Africa Renewal, 2010). Arend 
Lijphart (1999:295-296) contested Sartori’s claim by arguing that democratic fragmentation 
and polarisation can increase the societal representation, which in turn can contain and reduce 
conflict, thereby promote stability. Lijphart’s work focused on the distinction between 
majoritarian and consensus democracy. The former is a model in which the majority of the 
population governs, whilst the essence of the latter is “as many people as possible”. Both 
models accept the majority rule over the minority rule. However, in contrast to the 
majoritarian democracy, the consensus democracy does not concentrate the governing power 
with the bare majority. Instead it aims at broadening the representation and participation in 
government. (Lijphart, 1999:2). In his study Patterns of Democracy (1999), Lijphhart 
analysed the effect of consensus democracies on five performance variables; (1) political 
stability and absence of violence, (2) low risk of internal conflict, (3) weighted domestic 
conflict index and (4) low levels of deaths from domestic terrorism. He concluded by showing 
that consensus democracy is correlated with all indicators, thereby it performs better than the 
majoritarian democracy with regards to democratic quality (1999:270-273). 
   Similarly, Tusalem (2015:31-32) shows that states that are more democratic, are also more 
likely to be politically stable over time. This because democracies have lower levels of 
political risks with regards to ethnic and religious tensions, socio-economic grievances, 
internal and external threats to the regime, and direct military intervention. He argues that 
because of the openness of the democratic regime, there will be lower levels of oppression of 
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political and civil rights. Consequently, the population will be less likely to hold grievances, 
which in turn reduces the risk of riots, protests and other civil disturbances1.  
   This study places itself with the literature arguing that democracy is highly resilient and 
therefore promotes stability. However, in order to reach democracy, it is important to 
understand the process of democratisation.  
 
2.2. Democratisation Theory 
Based on the description of democracy given by the UN General Assembly2, democratisation 
is defined as the process whereby a state transforms into a democratic regime. It is a complex 
process and is not likely to have a universally applicable course of development. Therefore, 
the discussion on what factors are the most conducive for a successful democratisation is 
widespread (Geddes, 2011:18-29). 
   Seymour Martin Lipset is one of the most acknowledged theorists on democracy. He argued 
that democracy is correlated with economic development, and that states are likely to become 
more democratic as they develop economically. This argument is rooted in the belief that an 
increase in states’ level of wealth would trigger socio-economic changes through a shift in the 
social classes of the society and a higher level of urbanisation as well as industrialisation 
(Lipset, 1959:100-102).  
   The mechanisms behind Lipset’s theory are seemingly true for many countries in the West, 
however, over time the main argument that all states that increase in wealth should also with 
time become more democratically invested has been contested. The reality in many non-
Western countries speaks a different truth, which can be noted in the development of many of 
the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as well as of many states 
in the MENA region. The former group of countries are recognised as emerging powers and 
have had striking economic developments; however, only Brazil, India and South Africa are 
considered to be democratic states (Öniş & Gençer, 2018:1792-1793). Similarly, only Israel 
                                               
1 See also Pérez-Liñán & Skigin (2017) who looks at the impact of party pluralism on the stability in 
democracies in Latin American countries between 1945 and 2010. They argue that pluralism reduces the risk of 
“bottom-up revolt”, since it opens up institutional spaces where opposition parties are allowed to engage in 
political processes. Consequently, promoting the democratic regime even further. 
2 The UN General Assembly describes democracy “a universal value based on the freely expressed will of 
people to determine their political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects 
of their lives” (UN, n.d.)  
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and Tunisia are recognised as democratic countries in the MENA region. However, despite 
Egypt being wealthier than Tunisia (Ventura, 2019), it is still considered an authoritarian 
regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019:39). This contest Lipset’s theory, which 
consequently has resulted in scholars taking another approach to explaining the process of 
democratisation.  
   In their study, Stepan and Linz (2013:15) analyses the democratisation process in the 
MENA region after the Arab uprisings. Their conclusion is threefold; (1) there is a positive 
relationship between democracy and the concept of “twin tolerations”, which refers to a state-
religion relationship where “religious authorities do not control democratic officials who are 
acting constitutionally, while democratic officials do not control religion” (Stepan & Linz, 
2013:17-19).  (2) There is a negative relationship between democracy and sultanism3 (Stepan 
& Linz, 2013:26-29), and (3) there is a negative relationship between democracy and 
countries that are “authoritarian-democratic hybrids”. Countries that are under this kind of 
regime type cannot be considered fully authoritarian or democratic, but rather a mix of both. 
This phenomenon has been noted in many Arab countries, such as Egypt and Lebanon. In 
many of these states there have been a tendency by the leading actors to protect themselves by 
introducing policies that are restrictive to the development of democracy. Nevertheless, there 
are factors that could facilitate a transition, however, the direction of this transition, either 
democratic or authoritarian, would depend on the nature of those factors. For example, factors 
that could stimulate a transition to authoritarianism are military coups or withering feelings of 
the dignity of citizens. Factors that instead could encourage a democratic transition are (1) a 
collaboration between secularist and religious groups and (2) a civil society which is strong 
enough to create opposition against authoritarianism (Stepan & Linz, 2013:20-23). 
   Similarly, to Stepan and Linz, increasingly more scholars argue that there is a positive 
relationship between a strong civil society and a positive democratic transition4. Hadenius and 
Uggla (1996:1621) describes civil society as a multifaceted phenomenon which manifests 
itself “whenever people combine, in one fashion or another, to pursue common objectives”. 
They argue that people who engage in the civil society can gain power and knowledge to 
actually influence the regime (Hadenius & Uggla, 1996:1628). 
                                               
3 Sultanism is in Stepan and Linz’s study (2013:26) described to arise in the extreme case “when domination 
develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master […] [and] 
operates primarily on the basis of discretion”. 
4 See for instance Orji (2009) 
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   This study intends to deepen the understanding of the impact of the civil society on the 
democratisation process by focusing on mainly one aspect, namely women. It aims to study 
the impact women can have on post-Arab revolution countries’ transition to democracy by 
analysing the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation through the 
lenses of the WPS agenda, in mainly Egypt.   
 
2.3. Women in the Arab World 
“Women’s full participation in national and local politics, in the economy, in academia and 
the media is fundamental to democracy and essential to the achievement of sustainable 
development and peace in all contexts — during peace, through conflict and post-conflict, 
and during political transitions” (UN Women, 2011)5.  
   The establishment of democracy has in many parts of the world happened simultaneously 
with the development of women’s rights. This was for instance seen in Brazil, Argentina and 
Turkey, where women constituted key actors in their transition from autocracy to democracy 
(Moghadam, 2008). Looking at the Arab region, the issue of women’s empowerment got 
increasingly more attention with the 2011 upheavals. Women played a variety of key roles 
during the revolution and their broad participation came to be an important signal that change 
was about to happen (Karman, 2016).  
   According to Karman (2016), women and youth were the biggest victims of the dictatorial 
regime, which for decades had failed to respect their basic human rights. However, in 2011, 
women across the region risked their lives and instead took leading roles as initiators of 
protests, activists, journalist and bloggers aiming at spreading the news and sharing the 
developments of the revolution (Allen, 2017). Women stood as equals with their male 
counterparts on the front lines, calling for change, whilst also refuting the stereotype of them 
being voiceless and oppressed (Abu Ras et.al: 2012:2). Their strong involvement developed 
into a parallel movement, where women demanded justice and the full respect for their rights. 
This resulted in the advancement of women’s rights reaching a peak in 2011 and many 
                                               
5 Remarks by Ms. Lakshmi Puri Deputy Executive Director of UN Women at High Level Human Rights 
Conference Sakharov Prize Network Public Event “Role of women in democratic transition Panel on “Women's 
Rights in Times of Change European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium, 23 November 2011. 
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believing that this development would be a turning point for women’s rights in the region 
(Song 2018:5-6). 
   Yet, only a year after the revolution women were facing backlash to the expansion of their 
rights, causing human rights activists to question the future developments (Abu Ras et.al: 
2012:22). According to Abu Ras et al. (2012), this backlash “was not only unexpected, but it 
was against the virtues and values of the revolutions - democracy that should ensure 
inclusiveness - and thus ever more surprising”.  
   The upheavals brought political instability, internal conflicts and deteriorating economic 
conditions, which has had significant consequences for women (Abu Ras et.al: 2012:5). 
According Esfandiari and Heideman (2015:304-305), women experienced substantial 
decrease of their rights and access to justice after the revolution. Women across the region are 
being excluded or highly underrepresented in the political sphere, and the lack of explicit 
provisions regarding gender-based discrimination in many state’s constitutions has resulted in 
institutionalised gender discrimination and the reinforcement of stereotypical gender frames 
(Abu Ras et.al: 2012:19). Additionally, women and girls are victims of sexual, physical and 
psychological violence, which negatively impacts their abilities and willingness to engage in 
the public sphere (Song, 2018:17-18). 
   According to Johansson-Nogués (2013:394), the setback to women’s rights has particularly 
been evident in Egypt and Tunisia. Prior to the revolution, Tunisian women were amongst 
those who enjoyed the most progressive rights, both in the public and private sphere. 
Similarly, Egyptian women also enjoyed some extensive rights, however, more forthcoming 
in the public sphere than in the private realm (Johansson-Nogués, 2013:398). Despite the fact 
that both countries had quite progressive women’s laws and policies before the revolution, 
gender equality is still yet to achieve. In both countries, women played significant roles in the 
revolution. The strong scenery that developed in the beginning of 2011, spread a sense of 
community, mutual respect and solidarity between the genders. Subsequently, women came 
to expect greater roles in the society and increased respect for their rights (Johansson-Nogués, 
2013:394).  
   However, several years after the revolution and it can be concluded that the reality has not 
lived up to the expectations. According to Alves (2015:314-315), the setback to women’s 
rights was mainly because of the issue being sidelined by the process of regime change. 
Consequently, Song (2018:19) notes that Egyptian” women [still] lack the resources and 
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pathways to seek justice and their lack of rights and freedoms is shown in every societal 
establishment – the law, the economy, health care, media, and the criminal justice system”. 
Similarly, Shash and Forden (2016:81-82) found in their studies that the biggest hinders for 
women in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, are the framing of the constitution and the unwillingness 
of the government to fully include women in all aspects of society.  
   Song (2018:44-45) and Johansson-Nogués (2013:399) also found that there has been a 
division between the feminist movement in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, where, on the one 
hand, the Islamic feminists are operating and on the other, the secular feminists. These two 
movements have adopted different approaches to increasing the respect for women’s rights. 
The former believes that Islam is egalitarian and gender equal, but the traditional religious 
discourse has so far primarily been male-dominated and serving patriarchal interests. They, 
therefore, aim to change the discourse by providing an alternative interpretation of the Quran. 
The latter group are promoting Westernism values that scrutinise the role of Islam, which in 
turn has created tension and challenges for these two movements to work together towards a 
common feminist agenda.  
   Scholars seem to agree that even though the upheavals did not deliver on the promises of 
women’s rights, it did fuel a discussion on women’s rights and the emergence of a new type 
of feminist movement. Women in the region are increasingly more active in the political and 
public sphere, raising their voices and challenging the status quo.  
   This study aims to expand the literature on the obstacles and facilitators for women’s 
political participation in Post-Arab revolution countries, by looking at the contemporary 
situation in mainly Egypt. It intends to deepen the understanding of the issue by analysing the 
matter through the lenses of WPS agenda.  
 
2.4. The Women, Peace, and Security Framework  
The WPS agenda was in 2000 unanimously adopted through resolution6 1325 (2000) on 
Women, Peace, and Security. The resolution is considered to be ground-breaking since it 
recognises the importance of a gender perspective on peace and security. Since the passing of 
resolution 1325, the UNSC has adopted seven more resolutions on Women, Peace, and 
Security, each widens the scope and understanding of the importance of integrating a gender 
                                               
6 United Nations Security Council Resolutions will hereinafter be referred to as UNSCR  
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perspective in peace and security efforts (NATO, 2018:3). Together the eight UNSC 
resolutions constitute the WPS agenda7 (UN Women, n.d.).   
   The WPS framework was created as a response to the strong advocacy from within the UN 
system and civil society organisations (CSOs). It mainly derives from the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (PeaceWomen, n.d.b) 
   The central aim of the WPS framework is to guide the promotion and protection of 
women’s and girl’s rights in conflict and post-conflict situations. It is built on four pillars: 
(1) the equal participation and influence of women and men in peace and security 
decision-making processes, (2) the protection and promotion of women’s and girls’ rights 
in conflict-affected situations or other humanitarian crisis, (3) the “prevention of conflict 
and all forms of violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations”, 
and (4) meeting the relief and recovery needs of women and girls (Sida, 2015:1-2).  
    This study is limited to focus on the first pillar of the WPS agenda, i.e. the equal 
participation and influence of women and men in peace and security decision-making 
processes. In order to reach sustainable peace, the WPS agenda stresses the importance of 
having an integrated approach, which incorporates efforts in politics, security and 
development and is based on human rights, including gender equality, the rule of law and 
justice activities (UNSC, 2013a:2)8.  
   Even though women have always been involved in war and peace-related situations, the 
concept of WPS has only just recently become a global “norm” (Parashar, 2018:1). Women 
are recognised as having important roles in “prevention and resolution of conflict and in 
peacebuilding, […] [and] for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security” 
(UNSC, 2000:1; UNSC, 2008:2)9. It is stressed that women’s participation in efforts 
regarding conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, if meaningful, have a 
positive impact on the effectiveness and sustainability of those efforts and on the political 
will and accountability (UNSC,2015:1)10.  
                                               
7 The WPS agenda is guided by Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 
(2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015) 
8 UNSCR 2122(2013) [S/RES/2122 (2013)] 
9 UNSCR 1325(2000) [S/RES/1325 (2000)] & UNSCR 1820(2008) [S/RES/1820 (2008)] 
10 UNSCR 2242(2015) [S/RES/2242 (2015)] 
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   The WPS agenda addresses not only the important role that women have in efforts to 
prevent and resolve conflict, but also the differentiated impact that conflict has on women 
and girls. Women are recognised as being the ones most affected by conflict, since they 
often become targets of sexual exploitation, violence, and abuse. They are also more 
likely to have to stay home from school to take care of the housework and the family. 
These circumstances have great impact on women and girls’ health, self-development, and 
empowerment, which later in the post-conflict process limits their capability in the social 
and political sphere (UNICEF, n.d.).  
   Even though progress has been made, there still remains gaps regarding women’s 
involvement in efforts of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. 
Women are often perceived as victims rather than actors of change. They rarely receive 
the necessary support or financial means to reach their full potential. Additionally, other 
identified obstacles are lack of security, rule of law and education as well as cultural 
discrimination, stigmatisation and marginalisation (UNSC, 2009a:2; UNSC, 2008:2)11.  
   Considering the impact that conflict has on women and girls, the WPS agenda stresses 
the importance of having effective institutions, and adequate and rapid responses to their 
particular needs (UNSC, 2009a:2)12. In order to maintain and promote international peace 
and security, the importance of a wider and dedicated commitment to increase the respect 
for women’s and girls’ human rights and participation on all levels of decision-making is 
highlighted. Emphasis is also given to the positive impact that the engagement by men 
and boys have on the promotion and meaningful participation of women (UNSC, 
2015:2)13.   
   The WPS agenda recognises the need for the empowerment, including the economic 
empowerment, of women and girls through, inter alia, education and capacity-building 
(UNSC, 2013a:3)14. Member states are urged to increase their support to CSOs and 
women’s organisations and to consolidate these groups when adopting new strategies 
during all stages of decision-making. Member states and relevant actors are also advised 
to ensure gender mainstreaming, increase the awareness of the WPS agenda, and to take 
necessary measures to increase women’s involvement in decision-making, by promoting 
                                               
11 UNSCR 1889(2009) [S/RES/1889 (2009)] & UNSCR 1820(2008) [S/RES/1820 (2008)] 
12 UNSCR 1889(2009) [S/RES/1889 (2009)] 
13 UNSCR 2242(2015) [S/RES/2242 (2015)]  
14UNSCR 2122(2013) [S/RES/2122 (2013)] 
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women’s leadership in conflict resolution, post-conflict planning and peacebuilding 
efforts (UNSC, 2009a:3-4)15.   
   There is throughout the eight resolutions reference to conflict and post-conflict 
situations. This language has proven to limit the perception of when and where the 
resolutions are applicable. This research argues that the concepts of conflict and post-
conflict are broader than what has been recognised. Hence, it argues that the eight 
resolutions constituting the WPS agenda are relevant in all cases where stability is 
aspired, thus, also in post-revolution settings.   
   According to the Council of Europe and the European Commission (2012:54-56), the term 
“conflict” derives from Latin and means collision. This paper uses the definition that the 
Council of Europe and the European Commission highlights as useful in their study, that is: 
“a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests 
or concerns”. A conflict can thus take different forms and be violent or non-violent, expected 
or accidental, and manageable or unmanageable. Subsequently, the definition of post-conflict 
is the end of a conflict, i.e. when an agreement has been reached from the disagreement that 
caused the conflict to occur in the first place (Council of Europe & European Commission, 
2012:89).  
   A revolution is in this thesis defined as a fundamental and sudden change in social and 
political structures. This change can either be peaceful or violent and primarily occurs when 
the population is unsatisfied with the regime and demands a change by forcing the ruling 
party to resign (Nationalencyklopedin, n.d.a). A revolution can thus be considered to be 
included in the concept of conflict, since it is also based on disagreements where the needs, 
interests or concerns of the parties involved are threatened. Similarly, post-revolution is part 
of the concept of post-conflict, since it is situation that occurs after the revolution has ended, 
i.e. when the ruling party has been removed from office.  
 
                                               
15 UNSCR 1889(2009) [S/RES/1889 (2009)] 
   14 
2.5 Implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda  
In 2010, after a call to action derived from paragraph 17 of UNSCR 1889 (2009)16, the UN 
developed a monitoring tool, including 26 quantitative and qualitative indicators (see table 
1)17. The aim of the tool is to serve as common basis for reporting on the implementation of 
the WPS agenda. States and other relevant actors should be able to assess the progress of the 
work on the WPS by using this tool. So far, it has been recognised as successful, since it has 
proven to increase the accountability and efforts of states to implement the WPS framework 
(PeaceWomen, n.d.c).  
   Figure 1 shows the countries that have adopted a national action plan (NAP) for the 
implementation of the WPS framework and the year it was launched. So far, only 79 out of 
193 of UN’s member states have adopted a NAP. Out of the these, only nine countries are 
from the MENA region, among these are Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, 
Niger, Palestine, and Tunisia (PeaceWomen, 2019). Egypt has recognised the importance of 
the WPS agenda on a regional level, and the country recently announced that it will be 
developing a NAP (CCCPA, 2019:1). The case of Egypt and Tunisia will be further discussed 
in the following chapter.   
   UN Women (2019:21-23) have identified several challenges of the implementation of the 
WPS agenda in the MENA region. Key challenges observed are the issues of awareness and 
availability of information about the WPS, particularly on the local level. The dialogue and 
workshop spaces are often limited to only a few elite actors due to language barriers and/or 
accessibility. There has also been a tendency by countries to perceive the WPS framework as 
only applicable to countries in active conflict, resulting in these countries perceiving it as not 
relevant for them.  
   Furthermore, it has been evident that some governments lack willingness, and capacity to 
fully engage on the WPS agenda, including to meaningfully collaborate with CSOs. 
Consequently, creating mistrust and the belief that there is little or no guaranteed commitment 
                                               
16 Paragraph 17 of UNSCR 1889 (2009)  states: “Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Security 
Council within 6 months, for consideration, a set of indicators for use at the global level to track implementation 
of its resolution 1325 (2000), which could serve as a common basis for reporting by relevant United Nations 
entities, other international and regional organizations, and Member States, on the implementation of resolution 
1325 (2000) in 2010 and beyond” 
17 Table 1 presents a selection of the indicators of the monitoring tool. The selection is based on the relevancy 
for this study, thus, only indicators that concerns women’s participation and where the member states hold the 
primary responsibility of reporting back to the UN are presented. 
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by relevant parties to the WPS framework. The WPS agenda calls for greater involvement of 
women on all levels of decision-making and while there remain big gaps on this issue, it has 
been evident that the problem not only lies in increasing women’s representation. It has been 
argued that women have to constitute at least 30 percent of the decision-makers for them to 
have an actual influence (Un Women, 2015: 175). However, in some cases, women are only 
given a tokenistic place at the table to fill quota stipulations or baselines, rather than positions 
from where they can have actual influence (UN Women (2019:24-26). 
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Notes: The type of data-collection method is identified by the letters following the QN (quantitative) or QL (qualitative) 
denotation:“/c” refers to content analysis methods that will require systematic analysis of extracted language, whilst“/r” 
refers to reports to be assembled that will require a standard agreed format. Source: UN Security Council (2010) Women 
and Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2010/498 (28 September 2010) Available at: 
https://undocs.org/S/2010/498  (Accessed 2019-07-19)  
Table 1 WPS: Indicators that concerns women’s participation and where the member states 
hold the primary responsibility of reporting back to the UN 
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Figure 1 National Action Plan for the Implementation WPS Framework 
 
Source: PeaceWomen (2019) Member States, [Online] PeaceWomen, Available at: https://www.peacewomen.org/member-
states (Accessed: 2019-04-01)  
 
2.6 Previous Research on the Women Peace and Security Agenda 
There is an extensive and growing literature on the WPS agenda, but there are still important 
gaps that need to be addressed. Scholars who have studied the topic in the MENA region have 
mainly focused on conflict-affected countries such as Iraq, Libya, Palestine, and Sudan18. 
However, little research has been made on the WPS agenda in Egypt. Scholars who have 
studied the subject have looked primarily on the issue of sexual and gender-based violence 
(SGBV) and gender mainstreaming in policy documents19. Even less research has been made 
on the WPS agenda with regards to women’s political participation.  
   Nasser (2018), is one of the few researchers who have studied the topic of the WPS agenda 
in Egypt. In her research, Nasser discusses the relevance of the WPS agenda for the 
                                               
18 See for example Farr, 2011; Sherwood, 2012; Langhi, 2014; Parry & Aymerich, 2018 
19 See for instance Amar, 2011 
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transitional process by incorporating the issues of SGBV, gender mainstreaming in national 
policies, and participation of women in decision-making. The aim of the research is to provide 
recommendations based on lessons learned from the WPS agenda. She argues that the 
mechanisms of the agenda should not be limited to conflict and post-conflict stages since they 
also are crucial to the development of democratic and resilient societies (Nasser, 2018:45). 
   The WPS agenda has been recognised as one of the most ground-breaking and 
comprehensive frameworks for the empowerment and promotion of women and their rights. 
Similar to Nasser, this research is also based on the understanding that the WPS agenda is 
relevant and beneficial for all countries, including post-revolution countries. Therefore, this 
research argues that by looking through the lenses of the framework, it can help bring further 
clarity to some of the prominent obstacles and facilitators of women in the political arena in 
Post-Arab revolution countries.  
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3. Cases: Egypt and Tunisia 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the case selection and provide a comparative 
understanding of the cases. It is divided into nine sections; (1) Case Selection, (2) The 
Egyptian Constitution (3) The Women of Egypt, (4) The WPS Agenda in Egypt, (5) The 
Tunisian Constitution, (6) The Women of Tunisia, (8) The WPS Agenda in Tunisia, (8) Egypt 
and Tunisia; Similarities and Difference, and (9) Why Constitutions Matter.  
 
3.1 Case Selection  
This study is limited to focus on Egypt, and two of its proclaimed objectives, namely 
achieving democracy and stability. It places itself with the literature arguing that democracy is 
highly resilient and therefore promotes stability. According to democratisation theory, there is 
a positive relationship between a strong civil society and a positive democratic transition. 
Therefore, this study intends to deepen the understanding of the civil society by focusing 
on the impact women can have on post-Arab revolution countries’ transition to 
democracy. It attempts to reach this objective by analysing the challenges and 
opportunities for women’s political participation through the lenses of the WPS agenda. 
   There are several reasons why Egypt constitutes an interesting main case. Firstly, the 
revolution in Egypt, like in many other Arab countries, began because the people had had 
enough. After unitedly demanding a change and forcing the president to step down, the 
Egyptians were hopeful about the future and it did not take long until Egypt started working 
on its democratic transition. However, eight years after the revolution and not much progress 
have been made. Therefore, the question remains, why has not Egypt, and many other Arabic 
countries, had a more successful transition? What is lacking in these countries to facilitate a 
successful democratic change?  
   Previous research has shown that democracy cannot exist without women (OECD, 
2018:10). Needless to say, the full and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of 
society is crucial. However, women in the region have historically been marginalised. Yet, the 
Egyptian women enjoyed quite progressive rights before the revolution and despite many 
believing that women’s rights would improve after the upheavals, substantial gender 
inequalities still remain (Johansson-Nogués, 2013:398). Therefore, there is reason to believe 
that there exists a relationship between Egypt’s failed democratic transition and the level of 
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gender inequality. In order to understand how women can impact the situation in Egypt, it is 
important to understand the challenges and opportunities for Egyptian women.  
   It is believed that the WPS agenda can shed a new light on the challenges and facilitators of 
women’s political participation in the region. Thus, analysing the issue through the lenses of 
the framework can bring new perspectives on why and how the meaningful participation of 
women in politics can increase, which in turn can provide insight on how women can help 
facilitate the transition to democracy, and in the longer run, stability. This is very much 
relevant to the case of Egypt, since two of the proclaimed goals of the county are to achieve 
democracy and stability.  
   Egypt has not yet adopted a NAP on the WPS agenda. However, the country recently 
announced that it will (CCCPA, 2019:2), which indicates that Egypt has acknowledged the 
importance and value of the framework. Considering that it is not possible to draw any 
conclusion of Egypt’s direct work on the WPS, Tunisia is in this study included as a 
comparative background case. This is beneficial since Tunisia has already adopted a NAP and 
will therefore, allow for a more deepened understanding of how, why and which provisions of 
the WPS agenda are useful for countries that are working on their democratic transition, but 
has not yet adopted a NAP. To conclude, by analysing the challenges and opportunities for 
women’s political participation, in mainly Egypt, this study believes that a new perspective to 
the debate will be added.  
 
3.2 The Egyptian Constitution 
Egypt is and has historically been, a strong military power with a political system based on 
republicanism and semi-presidentialism. Since 1952, almost all of the Egyptian presidents 
have had a background in the military. The country has undergone several transformations, 
which can be seen in the adoption of its several constitutions20 (Nationalencyklopedin, n.d.a).  
   The revolution of 2011 paved the way for a new political landscape, where freedom and 
democracy stood high on the agenda. Quite soon after al-Sisis had taken office, the country 
adopted its current constitution, the 2014 Egyptian constitution, after years of political and 
ideological polarisation. Both al-Sisi and the 2014 constitution were welcomed with opened 
arms and according to Shalaby (2016:11), women played an essential role in bringing them 
                                               
20 Such as the Constitution of 1953, 1956, 1958, 1964, and 1971 
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into power. However, after the election of al-Sisi for president, the old Egyptian political 
system was almost fully reinforced. Al-Sisi has worked to increase his constitutional power 
and in April 2019, the Constitution of 2014 was amended in favour of the president’s wishes 
(Landguiden, 2019a).  
      The constitution clearly states that Egypt is operating on the principles of democracy and 
republicanism, whereby the supreme power is retained by the people and their elected 
representatives; 
 
“The Arab Republic of Egypt is a sovereign state, united and indivisible, 
where nothing is dispensable, and its system is democratic republic based 
on citizenship and the rule of law” (Article 1).  
 
“The rule of law is the basis of governance in the state. The state is subject 
to the law, while the independence, immunity and impartiality of the 
judiciary are essential guarantees for the protection of rights and 
freedoms” (Article 94) 
 
 
According to the constitution, the democratic governing system is built on three branches – 
the legislative, executive and judiciary. The constitution affirms the independence of all three 
branches as well as of institutions, such as for human rights, the press and academia. Islam is 
the state religion and Sharia is the principle source of legislation. The president, which is 
elected every four years, is the head of state and the head of the executive. The prime minister 
is responsible for directing and overseeing the work of the government, which in turn is 
responsible of determining public policies. (Meyer-Resende, 2014:9). The Egyptian 
parliament is unicameral, consisting of the House of Representatives, which has 596 seats 
(Nationalencyklopedin, n.d.a). In addition, Egypt is divided into 27 provinces with 27 
administrative units (local councils), which are entitled some legal power and are governed by 
governors. The representatives in the local council are elected to office for a term of four 
years. (State Information Service, n.d).  
   In 2019, the constitution was amended, giving more power to the president. Article 151 now 
stipulates that the president has the right to appoint two vice-presidents, the heads of the 
judicial bodies, the prosecutor general, the head of the Constitutional Court and the deputy 
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head of the Court. The constitutional amendments also include provisions giving the president 
the right hold office for six years instead of four (see Article 140 and 241 in appendix 4).  
    Lastly, the constitution also includes a set of new articles that in theory strengthens the 
protection of certain rights, including women’s right21. For instance, for the first time, women 
are entitled full citizenship through Article 6;  
 
 “Citizenship is a right to anyone born to an Egyptian father or an Egyptian 
mother. Being legally recognized and obtaining official papers proving his 
personal data is a right guaranteed and organized by law”  
 
Despite the provision of the 2014 constitutions, Egypt is still considered an authoritarian 
regime (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019:39). The country has been criticized for 
corruption, limited respect of human rights, including freedom of expression and civic 
freedom, and lack of transparency (Freedom House 2018a). Additionally, many of the 
included provisions are vaguely formulated, leaving essential aspects to be determined by 
law. Although, the power supposedly belongs to the citizens, the president and the military 
still have significant impact on civilian matters (Fedtke, 2014:9; Meyer-Resende, 2014:4). 
Despite the constitution affirming the independence of the executive, judiciary, legislative and 
other institutions, there are no clear guarantees of how this independence is ensured. 
Therefore, due to interlocking institutions, there is risk for overlapping responsibilities, and 
hence, accountability issues. Moreover, rather than limiting the power of the military, the 
constitution increases its protection and allows it to enjoy greater privileges (Meyer-Resende, 
2014:10-11).  
 
“Rights and freedoms of individual citizens may not be suspended or 
reduced. No law that regulates the exercise of rights and freedoms may 
restrict them in such a way as infringes upon their essence and foundation” 
(Article 92) 
 
Apart from Article 92, the provisions aiming at strengthening the protection and full respect 
of human rights are note clearly specified, leaving aspects to be determined by national law 
                                               
21 Constitutional provisions concerning women’s rights will be further analysed and discussed in the section 6. 
Analysis and Discussion of Results    
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(Meyer-Resende, 2014:12). Consequently, there is an issue of accountability and protection of 
these rights. Firstly, there exist some uncertainty regarding whether the elections after the 
upheavals have been free and fair. For instance, there is limited spaces for political opposition 
and pluralism, as liberals and Islamists are threatened with prosecution (Freedom House 
2018a). Secondly, women, Christians,	Shiite Muslims and LGTB-persons22 frequently face 
discrimination, and despite Egypt adopting several laws to prevent domestic violence, sexual 
harassment and female genital mutilation, these are still among the most acute challenges in 
the society. Lastly, the spaces for activism, CSOs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and journalism have been, and still are, limited (CIVICUS, 2016a). However, actors meeting 
certain criteria stated in the law are allowed to operate, as long as they are not formed on the 
basis of religion, promoting too controversial issues or engaging “in work deemed to harm 
national security, public order, public morality, or public health” (Freedom House 2018b).  
   Despite the constitution being more progressive and including many improvements with 
regards to democratic principles, it is clear that it has so far not met the people’s expectations. 
Nevertheless, the constitution matters, but why does it matter? This will be further discussed 
in section 3.3.5 Why Constitutions Matter. 
 
3.3 The Women of Egypt  
Looking back to ancient Egypt, women were under the law given the same rights as men. It 
was the social status rather than gender that determined a person’s rights. Scholars have 
concluded that women in ancient Egypt enjoyed more equal rights than the Egyptian women 
of today (Mark, 2016). Nevertheless, Egyptian women have had the right to vote since 1956 
(World Economic Forum 2017:142-143), and the country ratified CEDAW in 198123 (UN 
Treaty Collections, n.d). Additionally, the country introduced its first quota system for the 
parliamentary election in 1979, which resulted in nine percent of women being elected for 
office. However, the quota system was short-lived and in 1986, it was completely 
removed. The discussion about quota systems was not re-introduced until 2009 and 
enforced in the 2010 election. Currently, with the 2019 amendments of the 2014 
                                               
22 LGTB stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
23 Egypt ratified CEDAW with reservations made to three articles (2, 16 and 29), where the country 
confirmed compliance as long as it does not counter to the Islamic Sharia 
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constitution, there are articles reserving 25 percent of the seats in the local council and the 
parliament to women. However, there is not a quota system on the party level, nor has any 
Egyptian party adopted a voluntary quota (International IDEA, 2019a).  
   Moreover, big inequalities between men and women still persist. Egyptian women are 
faced with unequal opportunities in their access to education, health care and the job 
market (Abdel Gafar, 2018:40). In 2017, Egypt was ranked as 135 (out of 149 countries) 
regarding gender-equality by the World Economic Forum (2018:11). The difference in 
gross enrolment rate in primary to tertiary education between men and women was in 
2016 quite equal, 78.9 percent and 78.4 percent, respectively (The World Bank, 2019a). 
However, the main gap arises in the post-graduation and pre-employment period. 
According to the International Labour Organisation (n.d), only 23 percent of women 
participated in the labour force in 2017, out of which 65.7 had higher education. This 
compared to the participation of men, which reached 69.6 percent with a total of 87.1 
percent with a completed higher education (The World Bank, 2019b). The majority of 
women are working with informal jobs, due to limited opportunities and mechanisms for 
women to access the job market. Moreover, a large population (55 percent) believe that 
women are not as capable as men to hold certain position, while an even bigger proportion 
(85 percent) of the population think that men should be prioritised on the job market, 
since women bear the primary responsibility for taking care of family and domestic chores 
(National Council for Women [hereinafter NCW], 2017:28).   
   Despite big challenges facing women’s empowerment, a total of 76 women were elected 
for office in the 2015 parliamentary election. Out of these, 56 were elected by list, whilst 
the remaining were chosen by the single-seat system. In addition, al-Sisi appointed 14 
women, resulting in 90 women, or 14.9 percent, taking a seat in the parliament. Table 2 
shows the development of women in parliament in Egypt between 1979 to 2015. The first 
female minister was appointed in 1962, however, today, only 11.8 percent of all ministers 
are women. In addition, there are only two governors and five deputy governors who are 
females (NCW, 2017:26). Even though there are prominent gaps, the percentage of female 
voters has increased and during the recent election, women constituted 44 percent of the 
voters. However, a high number of women have fallen off the grid, because of lack of 
national identification (ID) cards, which are necessary for all citizens to be able to 
exercise their political, social and economic rights (NCW, 2017:28).  
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   In March 2017, Egypt adopted a new national strategy for the Empowerment of 
Egyptian Women 2030 (hereinafter Strategy 2030). The new strategy is aligned with the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and aims at empowering women politically, 
economically and socially. The goal of the strategy is to enable women to become key 
players in the development process by 2030 (NCW, 2017:3-5).  
 
Table 2 The Development of Women in Parliament in Egypt 
 
Source: National Council of Women (2017) National Strategy for the Empowerment of Egyptian Women 2030 Vision and 
Pillars, [Online] National Council of Women, Available at: http://ncw.gov.eg/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/final-version-
national-strategy-for-the-empowerment-of-egyptian-women-2030.pdf, (Accessed 2018-10-04)  
 
3.4 The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Egypt  
Egypt has not yet drafted a NAP on the WPS agenda, however, on the 31st of May, the 
country announced that the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping 
and Peacebuilding (CCCPA) in coordination with the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign affairs 
and the NCW will develop Egypt’s first NAP on WPS (CCCPA, 2019:2).   
   Within the region, Egypt is leading the efforts on the implementation of the WPS agenda. 
The Egyptian think tank, the CCCPA is responsible for Egyptian efforts in Africa and the 
Arab region. These efforts include training, education, and capacity building in efforts of 
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preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and post-conflict rebuilding (CCCPA, n.d.). The 
CCCPA works closely with other countries in the region on gender mainstreaming in 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding as well as on training and prevention of 
sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations (CCCPA, 2019:1-2).  
   Even though the NAP on the WPS is still to be developed, some efforts which are in line 
with the framework have already been made. These efforts include the adoption of the 
Strategy 2030 and the 2019 amendment of the 2014 constitution which reserves 25 percent of 
the seats in the parliament and local councils to women. This will be further discussed in 
section 6 Analysis and Discussion of Results. 
 
3.5 The Tunisian Constitution 
Three years after the revolution, Tunisia adopted its current constitution, the 2014 
constitution. According to Williams and Mahmoud (2014), the constitution is a welcomed 
outcome after a short, but hectic period of consensus politics, dialogues, and compromises 
between Islamists, secularists, and liberals. It provides for a republican semi-presidential 
system, whereby the power is retained by its citizens and their elected representatives. It 
also ensures the commitment of the state to further decentralise the power.  
 
” Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship, the will of the people, and the 
rule of law” (Article 2) 
 
“The state commits to strengthen decentralization and to apply it 
throughout the country, within the framework of the unity of the state” 
(Article 14) 
 
 
Similar to Egypt, the Tunisian governing system is also built on three branches – the 
legislative, executive and judiciary. The constitution also ensures the independence of all 
three branches of the governing system, and of other institutions such as academia and 
human rights. The state religion is Islam and Sharia is the principle source of legislation. The 
president shares executive power with the prime minister. The former is elected for a five-
year term and is responsible for both the security of the nation and its foreign policy. The 
   27 
latter is appointed by the parliament and is responsible for Tunisia’s domestic policy. The 
legislative branch consists of a unicameral parliament, the Assembly of the 
Representatives of the People. The parliament consists of 217 seats, which are elected 
every five years (Landguiden, 2019c). Additionally, Tunisia is divided into 350 
municipalities, which are entitled some power (Mekki, 2019).  
 
” The judiciary is independent. It ensures the administration of justice, the 
supremacy of the Constitution, the sovereignty of the law, and the 
protection of rights and freedoms. Judges are independent with the law 
being the sole authority over them in discharging their functions “(Article 
102)  
 
In contrast to Egypt, the Tunisian constitution balances the political landscape by 
regulating the military power. It is stated that the military has to be completely neutral 
with regards to politics and supportive of civilian authorities (Fedtke, 2014:16-17). The 
constitution also includes provision that strengthen human rights, in particularly the rights 
of women24, children and people with disabilities. Article 49 explicitly states that rights 
and liberties are protected and guaranteed: 
 
“The limitations that can be imposed on the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed in this Constitution will be established by law, without 
compromising their essence.”  
 
According to Fedtke (2014:4), Tunisia has managed to create a balanced constitution, which 
incorporates a modern approach to the institutional frameworks, the branches of government 
and to the protection of human rights. Looking at the development of Tunisia since 2011, it 
has been recognised that the country has, so far, performed fairly well. However, Tunisia is 
only considered a “flawed democracy” (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019:31-32), which 
is mainly due to persistent authoritarian structures, underdeveloped governance and limited 
political participation and transparency (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019:39).  
                                               
24 Constitutional provisions concerning women’s rights will be further analysed and discussed in the section 6. 
Analysis and Discussion of Results    
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   Tunisia also has issues concerning corruption, economic stability and national security 
(Freedom House, 2018b). Despite efforts to decentralise the power, the law-making is still 
quite centralised to the executive (Fedtke, 2014:11). Additionally, the election for local 
councils have repeatedly been postponed, which has resulted in limited representation of 
opposition parties, as well as of women, in these instances. Furthermore, only Muslims are 
allowed to run for president, and despite more progressive human rights, LGTB is still illegal.  
   Despite provisions ensuring freedom of expression, actors spreading controversial 
messages continues to be pressured from the government. Nevertheless, the democratic 
election in 2014 was recognised as fair and so far, the political arena is considered free, 
credible and somewhat opened to pluralism. Additionally, the spaces for CSOs, activists, 
and journalism have increased (CIVISUC, 2016b). 
  
3.6 The Women of Tunisia  
Tunisian women have for a long time enjoyed progressive rights compared to many other 
women in the region. In 1956, the first president of the country, Habib Bourguiba, adopted 
the Code of Personal Status (CPS), which was a set of laws that increased equality 
between men and women. The CPS included the establishment of women’s suffrage and 
the right for women to run for office (Landguiden, 2016b). Additionally, the country 
ratified CEDAW in 1985 and was in 2011, the first State in the region to withdraw all its 
reservations to the convention (UN Women, 2019:9).  
   In 2004, under the former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime, gender quota 
systems at the local and national levels were introduced. As a result, women received 23 
percent of the seats in the parliament and 27 percent of the seats in the municipal council 
(The Program on Governance and Local Development, 2016:2). Additionally, in the 2009 
election, Tunisia had the highest number of women in parliament in the region, namely 
27.9 percent (Dahlerup, Danielsson & Johansson, 2012:5).  
   For the election to the Constituent Assembly in 2011, a proportional representation 
system was introduced, which ensured a 50 percent representation of women on the 
electoral lists. Despite the progressive parity system, women only received 27 percent of 
the seats (Dahlerup, Danielsson & Johansson, 2012:5). Nevertheless, for the 2014 
parliamentary election, a vertical alternation of party lists was added to the proportional 
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representation system. Women now hold 47 percent of the seats in local councils and 31 
percent of the seats in the parliament. In addition, the first female mayor was elected for 
the capital, Tunis, in 2018 (Un Women, 2019:13). However, similar to Egypt, Tunisia 
does not have a quota system on the party level, nor has any party adopted a voluntary 
system to increase women’s representation (International IDEA, 2019b). 
    The future of Tunisian women is looking prosperous. In 2016, the gross enrolment rate 
in primary to tertiary education was higher for females than men, namely 86,2 percent and 
78.9 percent, respectively (The World Bank, 2019a). Additionally, Tunisia was in 2017 
ranked as the 119 most gender-equal country out of 149 countries, making it one of the 
best-performing countries in the region (World Economic Forum, 2018:11).   
 
3.7 The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Tunisia  
Previously, Tunisia had not shown any interest in taking actual steps towards the 
implementation of the WPS agenda and studies have shown that lack of awareness and 
understanding of the framework were the main reasons for the delayed development 
(Rayman, Izen & Parker, 2016:4-5). However, in 2018, after calls by the civil society, 
Tunisia finally adopted a NAP, which is supposed to guide the country’s work on the WPS 
framework until 2020 (Un Women, 2019:6). According to Labidi25, the Tunisian 
implementation reflects the commitments made by Tunisia to international law and more 
specifically SDG 5, achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls, (Tunisia 
Now, 2018).  
   The Tunisian NAP is built on five pillars; (1) prevention, (2) protection, (3) participation, 
(4) relief, peacebuilding and reconstruction, and (5) information and advocacy. It is based on 
one overall objective26 and five specific objectives, out of which three are in the context of 
increasing women’s roles and participation in the public and political sphere. The three 
specific goals are; (1) “promote the participation of women and girls in Tunisia in political 
life, governance and decision-making in order to maintain peace, resolve conflicts and 
                                               
25  Néziha Labidi is the Tunisian Minister for Women, Family, Child and Elderly Affairs, 
26 The overall objective “is to empower women and girls, to promote their participation in the achievement 
of lasting peace and stability, to eradicate all forms of gender-based discrimination and to ensure the 
protection of society against the risks of conflict, extremism and terrorism” (Republic of Tunisia, Ministry 
of Women, Family, Childhood and the Elderly, 2018:5) 
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confront terrorism, [2] Achieve greater participation of women and girls in public and 
political life, governance and decision-making, [and 3] Strengthen the role of women and 
girls in peacebuilding and sustainability, reconstruction efforts and Counter-terrorism” 
(Republic of Tunisia, 2018:9-10).  
   The Tunisian NAP recognises the important roles women have in conflict resolution, 
peacebuilding and the prevention of extremism and terrorism. It also states that “although 
Tunisia has not experienced armed conflict, it strives to ensure peace and security during the 
democratic transition, betting on the importance of adopting the gender approach at all levels 
to prevent the risks” of instabilities, such as armed conflict, civil wars and social unrest 
(Republic of Tunisia, 2018:5). This is line with the approach taken in this paper, namely that 
the mechanisms of the WPS framework are relevant to all countries, including post-revolution 
countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia.  
 
3.8 Egypt and Tunisia: Similarities and Differences  
Comparing the case of Egypt with Tunisia; both countries are republican states, have a history 
of Sunni Islamism, authoritarianism and former presidents with backgrounds in the military. 
(Meijer & al-Zwaining, 2015:8-9). Both countries also managed to overthrow their presidents 
quite soon after the start of the upheavals and have since managed to hold at least one 
democratic election (Kao and Lust, 2017:1-2). The revolutions resulted in a change in the 
political landscape in both countries and even though it was comparable forces that caused the 
revolution to happen, the outcome of it has not been as similar as one could have expected.  
   Despite Tunisia and Egypt adopting their constitutions at the same time, Tunisia has 
managed to create a more balanced framework based on pluralism, greater decentralisation 
and stronger respect of human rights. Tunisia has generally managed to perform fairly well 
and is now considered a flawed democracy, whilst Egypt is still recognised as an authoritarian 
state. The Egyptian constitution also include some progressive provisions; however, it is 
somewhat vaguely formulated, which has impacted its implementation (Fedtke, 2014:16). 
Nevertheless, both countries share similar challenges to their transition to democracy, though, 
some more persistent in Egypt, than in Tunisia. Firstly, both countries are facing challenges 
concerning economic stability and national security. These issues are, however, more 
prominent in Egypt than in Tunisia. For instance, Egypt’s geographical location has made the 
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country particularly vulnerable of terrorism and extremism, which in turn has impacted its 
economy (The Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018:8).  
   Additionally, corruption, lack of transparency, decentralisation of power and pluralism are 
still prominent issues. However, Tunisia has performed better than Egypt on these points. For 
instance, in both countries only Muslims are allowed to run for office, but in Egypt there is 
also restrictions for liberals and Islamists. The power is, according to the constitution of each 
country, retained by the people. However, in Egypt it has been evident that both the executive 
and the military have important influence. Additionally, the 2019 amendments of the 
constitution strengthens the Egyptian military’s protection and allows it to enjoy greater 
privileges. Similarly, in Tunisia, the executive still retains a significant amount of power, 
however, unlike, Egypt, the Tunisian military does not have the same influence on political 
issues, though they did receive the right to vote in a new law adopted in January 2017 
(Freedom House 2018a; Freedom House, 2018b). Another issue more worrying in Egypt than 
in Tunisia, is that of the independence of the judiciary, executive and legislative. The vague 
language in the Egyptian constitution has resulted in interlocking institutions, which in turn 
has led to overlapping responsibilities and accountability issues (Meyer-Resende, 2014:10-
11).   
   Both countries have strengthened their constitutional language on the protection of human 
rights. There has also been progress on the implementation of these provisions, however, 
limitation to these rights still exists (Freedom House 2018a; Freedom House 2018b). Overall, 
human rights in Tunisia have been strengthened and citizens, including women, enjoy greater 
political and civil liberties. Compared to Egypt, Tunisia has a longer history of women in 
decision-making positions and bigger spaces for freedom of expression and civic rights 
(Meijer & al-Zwaining, 2015:8-9). However, discriminatory structure against LGTB-persons 
still remains and despite the increase of spaces for CSOs, activists, and journalists, there are 
still restriction on how they can operate and what they can advocated (CIVISUC, 2016b). 
   Egypt, on the other hand, has repeatedly been criticised for not fully respecting human 
rights, including freedom of expression and civic freedom. (Meyer-Resende, 2014:12). 
Similar to Tunisia, LGTB is illegal, however, in Egypt, women and Shiite Muslims also face 
discrimination on a regular basis. Lack of accountability and clear constitutional provisions 
are among the greatest challenges to the full respect and protection of human rights (Meyer-
Resende, 2014:12). Additionally, the restrictive structures for CSOs, NGOs, media and 
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activist are also present in Egypt. However, these are more restrictive in Egypt than in 
Tunisia, since only actors meeting the criteria stated in the law are allowed to operate 
(Freedom House 2018b). Lastly, despite women playing essential roles in the revolutions in 
both countries and also in the beginning of the post-revolution period, the women of Egypt 
have not managed to be as successful in pushing for genuine social and political reforms 
(Shalaby, 2016:11).  
   Despite Tunisia generally performing better than Egypt, it has been evident that the reality 
in both countries do not live up to the progressive provisions of their respective constitutions. 
Thus, it may create questions of whether constitutions matter. This issue will be discussed in 
the following section.    
 
3.9 Why Constitutions Matter  
A constitution is a legal-political framework describing the basic principles, structures and 
processes of the state, the government and the fundamental rights of citizens (International 
Idea, 2014:1). According to Al-Ali (2012), the setting in countries transitioning from 
autocracy to democracy are often very complex, thus, the development of a new constitution 
based on democratic values might be a very time-consuming and multifaceted process. 
Nevertheless, a good constitution is proven to be essential for a number of reasons. Firstly, it 
can be directly or indirectly transformative and have important impact on how well a state 
function. It can also impact the level of a state’s democracy and the quality of life of its 
citizens (Constitutionnet, 2016). Additionally, it strengthens the legitimacy of authorities, 
“enables an orderly and peaceful society, protects the rights of individuals and communities, 
and promotes the proper management of resources and the development of the economy” 
(International IDEA,2015:6-7).  
   Lowenthal and Bitar (2015), have highlighted a set of factors that constitutes the basis for a 
successful framework; (1) it requires a broad participation and support of many, (2) it has to 
be inclusive and owned by the citizens of the state, and (3) it has to address central concerns 
of key sectors. Relating this to the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, it can be noted that despite the 
fact that both countries have improved their constitutions with regards to democratic values 
and human rights, there still remains gaps and limitations, hence, the constitutions could 
benefit from further amendments (Lowenthal and Bitar, 2015).  
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4 Methodological Approach and Design  
The purpose of this chapter is to present and justify the methodological approach employed, 
including an evaluation of the method, analytical frameworks, and data used to reach the aim 
and answer the research questions: 
 
General question:  
Q. How to understand challenges and opportunities for women in the political arena in post 
Arab-spring countries? 
 
Specific research questions:  
Q1: What are the current challenges to women’s political participation in Egypt?  
Q2: What are the current existing enabling factors for women’s political participation in 
Egypt?  
Q3: What would women like to change to facilitate their political participation in Egypt?  
Q4: What roles do women perceive for themselves in the political arena in Egypt?  
 
4.1 Qualitative Content Analysis  
The theoretical method used to analyse the collected data and answer the research questions 
was a qualitative content analysis. The qualitative content analysis is useful when the purpose 
of the analysis is to find a particular pattern in a set of texts, be it primary or secondary 
material, or verbal or written data. The aim of the method is to make a systematic and 
analytical description of the content of a text by successively classify the material in a coding 
frame. The coding frame is built on a set of questions and codes that are used to classify and 
analyse the collected material (Boréus & Bergström, 2018:50-51).  
   After the research questions were formulated, the first step of the qualitative content 
analysis used in this research was to collect and select the relevant material based on the 
desired generalisability. The data used in this study is derived from interviews, the 2014 
Egyptian constitution, including the 2019 amendments, the 2014 Tunisian constitution, a note 
written by the Egyptian Ambassador Moushira Khattab on UNSCR 1325 (hereinafter Note on 
UNSCR 1325) and Strategy 2030. These were in the second step, following the transcription 
of the interviews, read repeatedly to acquire a good overall understanding of the material. In 
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the next step, the thematical analysing tool of the computer software, NVivo, was used to 
examine the material, where the content falling outside the relevance of the interview guide 
was left out. Based on the remaining material, a main theme was formulated, guided by the 
research questions. In the second step, the 2014 Egyptian constitution, including the 2019 
amendments, and the 2014 Tunisian constitution, (hereinafter policy documents) were left out 
to be analysed separately. Thereafter, categories were created from the interviews, the Note 
on UNSCR 1325 and Strategy 2030 (hereinafter opinion documents). In the final step, these 
categories were divided into a set of subcategories, which constituted the foundation of the 
analysis.  
   The analytical framework of the opinion documents included seven codes; (1) the 
perception of equal participation between men and women, (2) the perceptions of women’s 
roles in politics, (3) current existing measures facilitating women’s political participation, (4) 
current existing obstacles for women’s political participation, (5) measures that should be put 
in place to facilitate women’s political participation, (6) measures in line with the WPS 
agenda, and (7) the expected development of women’s political participation. 
   The framework used for the analysis of the policy documents differs slightly from the main 
analytical framework. It is based on the same main theme; however, the focus of analysis was 
guided by the results of the analysis of the opinion documents, specifically the identified 
challenges and the enabling measures for women’s political participation. Two main elements 
were analysed; (1) constitutional provisions aiming at increasing women’s political 
participation, and (2) similarities and differences between Egypt’s and Tunisia’s 
constitutional provisions aiming at increasing women’s political participation. Figure 2 
provides for an overview of the main theme, categories, and subcategories used in both 
analytical frameworks.  
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Figure 2 Main Theme, Categories, and Subcategories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Semi-structured interviews  
In order to answer the research questions, semi-structured interviews (SSI) were conducted.  
SSI is beneficial to use whenever the researcher is trying to receive an understanding of the 
perceptions of an issue. The interview guide is semi-structured and contains a set of open-
ended questions (see appendix 3). It was guided by Harvard’s Strategies for Qualitative 
Interviews (n.d.) and interview guides from similar studies on women’s political 
participation27. Open-ended questions are favourable to use when the researcher aims to 
receive detailed and more nuanced answers about the respondent’s experience and 
knowledge. In addition, open-ended questions within a semi-structured interview are 
beneficial since it also gives the interviewer the option to ask follow-up questions (Adams, 
                                               
27 See for instance IFES, (2014) and IPU (2000) 
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2015:492-493). All of the interviews conducted for this study were recorded and later 
transcribed and analysed in NVivo. 
   The process of selecting respondents was quite challenging. To receive first-hand 
knowledge about the challenges and opportunities for women on the political arena, the main 
plan was to conduct interviews with women that are currently active in politics. Therefore, to 
get better access to the relevant respondents and also a more comprehensive understanding of 
the situation of women in Egypt, a field study for two months to Cairo was conducted. 
However, these respondents were difficult to reach. Therefore, some alterations had to be 
made to the main plan. Instead, interviews with a set of people with different backgrounds 
were conducted. However, all the respondents included in this study have in-depth knowledge 
on the issues based on own experience and/or research. Hence, the problem of representation 
was solved for, since the participants still provide for a comprehensive material of analysis.  
   In total seven interviews with eight respondents were conducted, six were held in English 
and one in Arabic with the help of an English interpreter. Additionally, three of the eight 
respondents wanted to be anonymous and only include the name of the organisations they 
were representing. The first interview was conducted on the 11 of February 2019, with a 
representative of the Peace and Security Department of UN Women’s Regional Office for the 
Arab States in Cairo. The interview session lasted for about 33 minutes and mostly covered 
general information on the WPS agenda and women’s roles in decision-making processes, 
mainly focusing on countries in the region.  
   The second interview was held on the 13 of February 2019, also in Cairo. The respondent 
was Laila Mohamed Kandil, who is a lawyer and the former head of the Department of the 
Officers at the Ministry of Interior of the Arab Republic of Egypt. In the interview, which 
lasted for 26 minutes, Kandil gave her perception of the challenges and opportunities for 
Egyptian women on the political arena. Owing to language barriers, an interpreter was 
brought in for this particular interview. The limitations of conducting an interview with the 
help of an interpreter will be discussed below.  
   The third interview took place on the 7 of March 2019, over Skype with two representatives 
from CCCPA’s department for Peace and Security. For about 50 minutes the two 
representatives talked about the work of Egypt and the CCCPA on the WPS agenda in the 
region. They also touched upon the challenges and opportunities for Egyptian women in the 
political sphere in Egypt. Since both respondents asked to anonymously represent their 
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organisation, this interview will be treated as one, i.e. the respondents’ answers will not be 
treated separately.  
   Furthermore, a fourth interview was held on March 19, 2019, with Hoda Elsadda, professor 
of English and Comparative Literature and a founding member and current chairperson of the 
board of trustees of the Women and Memory Forum. The interview was held at the office of 
the Women and Memory Forum in Cairo. Elsadda was one of the five women involved in the 
drafting of the 2014 Egyptian constitution and during the interview, which lasted for 25 
minutes, she talked about her experience on being on the constitution drafting committee and 
also about the general situation of politically active women in Egypt.  
   The fifth interview was conducted on March 20, 2019, with UN Women’s country 
representative for Egypt, Blerta Aliko, at UN Women’s Country Office for Egypt in Cairo. 
During this interview, Aliko explained Egypt’s approach and work on the WPS agenda. 
Additionally, she talked about some of the challenges and opportunities that currently exist 
for politically active women, and also about the efforts of the government to increase 
women’s roles in society and politics.  
   The sixth interview was held on the 1 of May 2019, over Skype with Marwa Shalaby, 
visiting scholar to the Program on Governance and Local Development at the University of 
Gothenburg and lecturer on research methodology, gender and politics of the Middle East. 
Through her own research, Shalaby has managed to get access to information and a 
comprehensive understanding of women’s issues in the MENA region. For about one hour 
and ten minutes, Shalaby talked about women’s rights, as well as the challenges and 
possibilities that women face in society and politics in both Egypt and Tunisia.  
   Finally, the seventh interview was conducted over Skype with UN Women’s Country 
Program Manager for Tunisia, Héla SKhiri. The interview lasted for 52 minutes and mainly 
covered the developments of, and challenges for women’s political participation in Tunisia. It 
also touched upon Tunisia’s work on the implementation of the WPS agenda.  
 
4.3 Note on UNSCR 1325 and the Strategy 2030 
In addition to the interviews, one note was received through personal communication with 
Ambassador Moushira Khattab, former Minister of Family and Population of Egypt. The note 
includes Ambassador Khattab’s view on the WPS agenda and her thoughts on the framework 
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in the Egyptian context. The note provides for good complementary information to the 
interviews since she has the first-hand experience of being a woman active in politics in 
Egypt. In addition, the Strategy 2030 is also included as a document of analysis, since it is a 
primary source of document provided by Egypt’s governmental entity for the empowerment 
of women, the NCW. The document portrays the current challenges and possibilities of 
Egyptian women in, inter alia, the political sphere.  
 
4.4 Policy Documents  
In order to get a more comprehensive understanding of women’s legal rights and 
opportunities in politics in Egypt and Tunisia, this research also includes the current 
constitutions of both countries, that is the 2014 Egyptian constitution, including the 2019 
amendments, and the 2014 Tunisian constitution.  
 
4.5 Analytical Framework  
The material retrieved for this study was analysed in NVivo through the method of qualitative 
content analysis. All data, except for the interviews, are presented as citations in their original 
form. Interview quotes are presented in their condensed form for clarification purpose, 
however, the content has not been altered.  
   The first analytical framework comprises the interviews, the Note on UNSCR 1325 and the 
Strategy 2030. The documents included in the first analytical framework will hereinafter be 
referred to as opinion documents since all of them express opinions on the identified 
subcategories and can thus easily be analysed jointly. Each respondent and the two documents 
have been appointed a number from 1-9. The coding is as follow:  
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Table 3 Coding of Opinion Documents 
#1: Representative of the Peace and Security Department of UN Women’s Regional Office for the 
Arab States in Cairo 
#2: Laila Mohamed Kandil  
#3: Representatives of the Peace and Security Department of the CCCPA 
#4: Hoda Elsadda 
#5: Blerta Aliko 
#6: Marwa Shalaby  
#7: Héla SKhiri 
#8: Note on UNSCR 1325  
#9: Strategy 2030  
 
The analytical framework of the opinion documents included seven codes; 1) the perception 
of equal participation between men and women, (2) the perceptions of women’s roles in 
politics, (3) current existing measures facilitating women’s political participation, (4) current 
existing obstacles for women’s political participation, (5) measures that should be put in place 
to facilitate women’s political participation, (6) measures in line with the WPS agenda, and 
(7) the expected development of women’s political participation. 
   The second analytical framework includes the legal documents. These have also been 
appointed a number from 1-3. The coding is as follow:  
 
Table 4 Coding of Policy Documents 
#1: 2014 Egyptian constitution 
#2: 2019 amendments of the 2014 Egyptian constitution  
#3: 2014 Tunisian constitution.  
 
For the analysis of the legal documents two elements were considered; (1) constitutional 
provisions aiming at increasing women’s political participation, and (2) similarities and 
differences between Egypt’s and Tunisia’s constitutional provisions aiming at increasing 
women’s political participation.   
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4.6 Limitations and Delimitations  
This research, like any other, has some limitations and delimitations. Out of the seven 
interviews, only two were with women who have first-hand experience working in the 
political arena in Egypt. Therefore, all of the respondents cannot be treated as giving a 
perception received through direct access to experience. Nevertheless, since the respondents, 
in one way or another, have expert knowledge on the issue, their input provided for a good 
general understanding of the issue and thus the problem of representation was solved for. In 
addition, Ambassador Khattab’s note constitutes a good compliment to the interviews, since 
she also has the first-hand experience of being an active female politician in Egypt. However, 
one limitation that can be noted from retrieving Ambassador Khattab’s perception from the 
note, is that it does not touch upon all issues included in the interview guide, nor did it allow 
for follow-up questions, which limited the possibility to draw any further conclusion from 
sections that were a bit unclear.  
   For one of the interviews, the help of an interpreter was needed. This provided for 
limitations regarding the ability to get a fully correct translation, since there is not always an 
equivalent meaning of Arabic words in English. However, since the interviews aimed at 
catching the respondent’s perception of the challenges and opportunities for politically active 
women, rather than comprehending the latent meaning of the answers given by the 
respondents, the issue of correct translation could be somewhat overlooked. Nevertheless, I 
know some Arabic and could thus account for the issues by asking follow-up questions or 
clarification whenever something was not clear.  
   Three of the respondents asked to be kept anonymous and to only included the name of the 
organisation that they are representing. In cases of authoritarian states and perhaps issues of 
limited possibility to speak freely, I would argue that anonymity provides for a more secure 
space where the respondents can feel safe to express their minds. Therefore, they will be more 
likely to answer the questions honestly. Hence, the issue of anonymity is not seen as a 
limitation in this particular case. 
   Furthermore, it would have been interesting to also include an interview with one 
representative from the NCW, but because of limited time and the inability to get in touch 
with them, the decision to not include them was made. Nevertheless, since it was possible to 
access the Strategy 2030, which is a primary source of document addressing the issues 
relevant to this research, the problem can be seen as somewhat solved for. Nonetheless, the 
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limitations highlighted for the Note on UNSCR 1325, namely the limited issues included in 
the document and the inability to ask follow-up questions, can also be argued for in this case.  
   In order to account for possible limitations of not having enough variety with regards to the 
opinion documents, this study also includes primary data in the form of legal documents. The 
inclusion of these documents allows for triangulation of the data, and thus, a more 
comprehensive review of the material. However, in order to allow for research depth, some 
delimitations to the focus of the study had to be made. Firstly, this research only includes 
three legal documents, i.e. the countries’ current constitutional framework.  However, since 
this study is mainly focusing on the contemporary situation in mainly Egypt, but also Tunisia, 
these frameworks are the most relevant to analyse and thus sufficient to give a justifiable 
understanding. Moreover, this paper does not aim to touch upon all the issues included in the 
legal frameworks, since it only focuses on the content that addresses women’s involvement in 
the realm of politics.  
   Another delimitation made because of limited time and scope was regarding the number of 
interviews conducted with regards to Egypt and Tunisia. Since this study primarily focuses on 
the challenges and opportunities for women in politics in Egypt and only has Tunisia as a 
comparative background case, the proportion of interviews concerning Egypt is bigger than 
the one concerning Tunisia. Nevertheless, the comparative element of this study is based on 
the interviews and also the background and previous research chapters, which provides for an 
equally extensive discussion of each case.  
   Lastly, when the interviews for this study were conducted, Egypt had not yet announced 
that it would be developing a NAP. Therefore, if these interviews were to be conducted at 
present time, the answers provided for the question regarding the WPS agenda could be 
slightly different. 
 
4.7 Validity, Reliability, and Transferability  
In the method of qualitative research, validity concerns the credibility of the interpretations of 
the included data (Silverman, 2013:285). Reliability, on the other hand, is the probability that 
a different observer would retrieve the same results by conducting the same research with the 
same method and data. Thus, in order to have validity, one must also have reliability 
(Silverman, 2013:448).   
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   A qualitative interview study poses some difficulties when it comes to reliability. All 
interviews are unique and can be impacted by factors such as the interviewer’s technique and 
experience. To increase the reliability of the data retrieved, test interviews, and one-to-one 
interviews were conducted in beforehand (Conwall et.al, 1995:575-576). Secondly, 
triangulation allows for the comparison of the interviews and the legal documents. This 
technique provides for the authentication of the collected data and thus, increases both the 
validity and reliability of the study. (Silverman, 2013:449). Thirdly, the data was analysed 
several times, also with some time in between each session, to make sure that the 
interpretation would be consistent (Kvale, 1995:22).  
   Lastly, in order to ensure that the interviews would accurately portray the phenomena 
analysed, the technique of ethical consideration in combination with transparency was used. 
The interview guide was carefully drafted and tested with neutral subjects before the actual 
interview sessions. Additionally, in order to provide for a more secure space where the 
respondent could speak freely on the issue, the respondents were in advance informed about 
the purpose of the interview and the research. They were also given the opportunity to be 
anonymous and it was made clear that their participation was voluntary, and that they had the 
right to abstain from answering questions.  
   Finally, the transferability of a research is according to Shenton (2004:69) concerning the 
extent to which findings of one study are generally applicable to other cases. The findings of 
this research are not expected to yield exactly the same outcomes in other states since all 
countries have different historical backgrounds, developments, and conditions. Nevertheless, 
given that the aim of this research is to study the impact women can have on post-Arab 
revolution countries’ transition to democracy by analysing the challenges and opportunities 
for women’s political participation through the lenses of the WPS agenda, parts of the results 
retrieved here could be transferred to other cases and provide for findings that are similar and 
in line with the ones of this research.  
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5 Results  
This section presents a summary, citations and quotes on the results retrieved from the 
opinion and policy documents28. The analysis of the opinion documents is based on the 
subcategories identified in the analytical stage. Moreover, the analysis of the policy 
documents is based on the challenges and opportunities for women’s political participation 
identified from the analysis of the opinion documents as well as a discussion on constitutional 
language on women’s rights, including similarities and difference between the Egyptian and 
Tunisian constitution.  
 
5.1 Opinion Documents  
5.1.1 The Perception of Women’s Roles and Equal Participation Between Men and 
Women in Politics in Egypt:  
#9 […] the belief that the Egyptian state’s stability and progress will only 
be achieved by ensuring the active participation of women in all aspects of 
national work [President al-Sisi’s Speech at the Celebration of the Egyptian 
Women’s Day 2017, 21 March 2017, (In Preamble)]  
 
There is a general understanding that women currently are underrepresented in the political 
arena in Egypt. Only one respondent stated that it was not a critical issue, though all agreed 
that women have to be included on all levels since they constitute half of the population and 
would thus bring a more balanced representation of the public opinion. Moreover, there seems 
to be an agreement that there has been some progress regarding women’s political 
participation, which partly has been evident in the number of women in ministerial and 
leadership positions.  
 
#2 No, of course they do not have equal participation. It’s not a critical 
problem, but I really believe that both men and women should be involved 
in politics.  
 
                                               
28 For more extensive citations and quotations see appendix 1 and 2 
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#3 We do have a lot of progress when it comes to this. We have more than 
six ministers now who are women and they actually work on different topics 
that are not really the normal topics tackled by women in general. 
 
The opinion documents clearly emphasise that women have important roles to play in 
political decision-making. It is stressed that women tend to focus on more prominent issues, 
such as healthcare, education, and livelihood, whilst men are usually more concerned about 
the issue of power. This mainly because women and their children are usually the ones most 
affected by conflict, which makes them keener to find a sustainable solution quickly. It is also 
noted that the increased inclusion of women can result in reduced levels of corruption and 
discrimination. Women are also recognised as being agents of peace, effective decision-
makers and crucial for the progress and stability of Egypt.  
 
#1 […] some studies have proven that having more women can actually 
reduce the level of corruption at a governmental level and at national level 
[…] They can bring different perspectives looking at maybe ensuring that 
financing is available for education, social care et cetera. […]. Generally, 
we think that women are more effective because they are the victims with 
their children of the conflict, they are more impacted by the conflict. 
 
#5 The way I see it, is that they bring a different perspective, they bring a 
different experience and it’s always more enriching than just having only 
men. 
 
#8 Voices of women can help create better institutions and stronger 
instruments. Women’s voice is capable of accelerating a revamped cultural, 
social and legal infrastructure that guarantees peace and security for every 
citizen without any discrimination. 
 
However, the opinion documents also stress that the increased inclusion of women does not 
necessarily translate into increased gender equality or gender mainstreaming since there are 
women that does not have the means or keenness to use their voices to promote women’s 
empowerment, women’s issues or change in general. Additionally, some of the respondents 
noted that women and men can serve the same roles if they are equally supportive of women’s 
issues. Yet, it was stressed that women generally are more effective at certain positions that 
   45 
concern social, cultural and legal structures, because of the different experiences and 
perspectives that they bring.  
 
#1 [Women’s roles are] hugely important. […] Having women is key and 
definitively useful. It doesn’t mean that it will translate automatically into 
gender sensitive policies or programs. There are some women that might 
not promote it that way, but it helps […]  
 
#2 I believe that men and women can play the same roles, but if we talk 
about women specifically, I believe that in certain positions that serves 
social purposes, a woman might perform better, women do definitely 
improve the efficiency of decision-making processes because women bring 
certain points of view that might help. 
 
5.1.2 Current Existing Measures Facilitating Women’s Political Participation:  
Except for the measures included in the constitution, only one respondent knew of any other 
existing measures aiming at increasing women’s political participation. She explained that the 
government of Egypt has created a presidential youth and leadership program, which aims at 
empowering young women and men. Moreover, she mentioned that there are millions of 
women living off the grid, due to lack of some form of identification. The government has, 
therefore, put forward efforts to provide these women with ID-cards, to enable them their 
basic human rights.  
 
#4 […] So, so far at least I’m not seeing the parliament doing very much to 
support women’s rights. 
 
#5 There are big efforts put forward by the government […]  under the 
leadership of the National Council for Women and the Ministry of Interior 
which equips those women with the ID-cards and integrates them in the 
national programs 
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5.1.3 Current Existing Obstacles for Women’s Political Participation in Egypt:  
There were some disparities regarding the perception of existing obstacles for women’s 
political participation. Some of the respondents claimed that the challenges lie in the cultural 
and social structures of society. Whereas, other respondents argued that the authoritarian 
nature in Egypt was the main challenge for women’s participation. Additionally, women’s 
empowerment was stated as not being a prioritised issue in a world dominated by men, where 
power structures are present and where women have to adapt by constraining their voices as a 
trade-off for being included in the decision-making realm. Other factors that were seen as 
obstacles were lack of education, political will, ID-cards and services supporting women’s 
involvement.  
 
#4 I would argue that we always need political will. Also, there are all sorts 
of traditions, obviously there are cultural problems, but I would highlight 
the political problems that support the argument that women’s issues are 
not a priority. 
 
#5 I think this is really a social issue, the problem is that no one is relieving 
her from her other duties that she has. So that actually it has to do with 
education and the overall levels of engagement there.  
 
#6 […] And because of the authoritarian nature of their regime, men are 
not giving them a chance to run. It is because of those hungry for power, 
the top, they don't want to leave any space for the women to have any kind 
of say in decision-making process.  
 
However, some of the respondents challenged the belief that limited access to education and 
power structures were the main problem. Instead, the mentality of the population and 
religious propaganda, such as traditional stereotypes, were emphasised as the primary 
challenges.    
 
#2 I believe that men and women are provided with the same tools when it 
comes to education and the freedom to get involved with any part the 
ministry. 
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#9 The Egyptian society witnessed transformations that propagate negative 
values, fostering an inferior view of women in society over the past few 
decades, adding to the challenges of women’s empowerment […] (p.11)  
 
5.1.4 Measures That Should Be Put in Place to Facilitate Women’s Political 
Participation in Egypt: 
Even though the opinion documents did not fully agree on the challenges, they do, however, 
seem to agree on the factors that should be put in place to enable women’s political 
participation. Quota systems on all levels were the main measure emphasised to increase 
women’s political participation. However, since Egypt has enacted quota systems before, the 
respondents were quick to point out that quota systems should not be endorsed alone. It was 
stressed that women’s empowerment is a collective responsibility that would benefit from 
having institutions and policies structured in a gender inclusive way. Moreover, the 
respondents argued that the quota stipulation should allow for a minimum inclusion of 
women, otherwise there is a risk of limiting the proportion of women to only meet the 
baseline of the quota. Additionally, it was stressed that a minimum of 30 percent of women in 
parliament was to strive for, since it could automatically translate into change. 
 
#1 Quotas are often set forward as a preliminary step to increase women’s 
participation […] if you have, for instance, within a parliament more than 
thirty percent women, there is an automatically sort of change and impact 
from that gender perspective into the law making. […] You should always 
when you mention a quota say “a minimum of” to ensure that it can always 
be higher so people don’t limit themselves to twenty percent 
 
#4 Quotas have been one method to address the obstacles facing women 
[…] I mean you see quotas are not just in parliament, you can have quotas 
on many different levels, you can have them at the level of local councils, at 
the level of parties. 
 
The opinion documents also emphasised the need for services, such as childcare and access to 
education, and a change in the discourse regarding women’s political participation through 
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awareness and encouragement programs. Other measures mentioned were the inclusion of 
NGOs and CSOs in the discussion, as well as the allocation of a budget specifically aimed at 
empowering women.    
 
#1 […] if you have quotas and to increase women’s participation it should 
be also supported by programs that you know support women locally to 
present themselves as candidates, to encourage women to take certain 
positions and promote them in doing so. It’s also like providing them with 
technical support, enhancing their voices et cetera.  
 
#2 Childcare is definitely a measure that could help. […] I believe that we 
need more awareness programs for women, to make them aware that they 
should be involved.  
 
#5 So, if you ask me what the key to empowerment is, it’s from the 
education and civic empowerment activities. I think that they are all 
interrelated, so the education gives you the space, the culture, the 
opportunity to be out first of all.  
 
#9 […] The Strategy affirms the necessity of engaging civil society 
organizations in implementing its programs and activities, especially Non-
Governmental Organizations (p. 61-62) 
 
5.1.5 Expected Development of Women’s Political Participation in Egypt:  
 
#2 I believe that in the upcoming decade it’s going to be much better and 
women will be involved more, because people are getting more aware of the 
idea of having women in politics.  
 
There was not a coherent response when looking at the future development of women’s 
political participation in Egypt. Some of the respondents were very positive, stressing that 
Egypt is on the right track and that the progression of women’s participation would be a 
natural course. However, everyone did not share this view and were rather sceptical regarding 
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the future developments. According to the more unconvinced respondents, the future of 
women in Egypt will depend on whether all groups, especially men and boys, priorities 
women’s empowerment and also if women jointly raise their voices and call for a change. 
 
#4 There has to be a decision to prioritize women’s issues. So, things don’t 
change on their own, but you have to have a strong women’s movement that 
support these changes  
 
#6 In Egypt the next years I think, given the political atmosphere that 
they're operating under, I think that they will continue navigating their way 
within the parameters of the authoritarian regime that is still in place.  
 
#9 Its success depends on the active participation of all social groups, 
especially men and boys, besides all State institutions and its executive 
bodies (p.7) […] Vision By 2030, Egyptian women will become active 
contributors to the achievement of sustainable development in a nation that 
guarantees their constitutional rights, ensures their full protection, and 
provides- without discrimination- political, social, and economic 
opportunities that enable them to develop their capacities and achieve their 
full potential  (p.21)  
 
5.1.6 Current Measures in Line with the WPS Agenda in Egypt:29 
Egypt has not yet created a NAP on the WPS agenda, which according to the opinion 
documents is because the country does not consider it to be relevant, since it is currently not 
in an active conflict. However, even though Egypt has not taken any direct measures to 
implement the agenda, there have been some developments on the national level that are in 
line with the WPS framework, such as efforts against SGBV and recovery assistance to 
refugees seeking refuge. Additionally, the majority of the respondents agreed that the 
provisions of WPS framework was important, even in the case of Egypt, and some even 
stressed that Egypt need to create a NAP for the future development of the country. However, 
noteworthy is that only four of the respondents were aware about the existence of the WPS 
agenda.  
                                               
29 Note: The interviews were conducted before Egypt had announced that it would develop a NAP.   
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#1 Egypt, they don’t have a 1325 action plan and their kind of approach to 
it is that they don’t really need one. They don’t consider it applies to them. 
[…] but indirectly they are focusing a lot on women’s participation. which 
is one of the pillars. They are also working on kind of recovery with 
assistance to refugees seeking refuge, so they are touching upon some of 
these pillars 
 
#3 If you want to talk nationally, I don’t think we can do that, again the 
context is conflict and post-conflict and Egypt is not in that situation  
 
#8 We [Egypt] need to formulate a national plan of action which targets the 
implementation of the relevant UN resolutions. […] Finally, we need to 
raise awareness of Security Council resolutions and […] this includes 
strengthening the perception of women as peace makers and agents for 
change not only as victims. 
 
Despite Egypt not developing a NAP, the country is seen to be one of the leading actors in the 
region regarding the WPS agenda. In this context, Egypt has several times stressed the 
importance of incorporating all four pillars of the framework, and particularly the meaningful 
participation of women as agents of peace. 
 
#3 Most of the time we work on the implementation of the women peace and 
security agenda in the region and in Africa, including 1325 and its four 
pillars and including of course the participation pillar.  
 
#5 Egypt was even spearheading the efforts of the region in developing a 
regional strategy for 1325. 
 
5.1.7 Egypt vs. Tunisia: 
  #5 Egypt is a very strong positive example for the Arab States, but also for 
Africa and the African Union. But also Tunisia because, Tunisia has made 
huge progress and especially on some of the laws are like amazing, but 
Egypt is another country with a lot of other dynamics and the population is 
much bigger and more complex […] 
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Comparing the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, one can note that the respondents seem to agree 
that both countries has, to some extent, had a positive development. However, it was noted 
that Tunisia has had more conducive conditions for prosperous change than Egypt. This 
mainly because of historical factors that have impacted the empowerment of women.  
Shalaby, who in her interview gave a very comprehensive explanation of why she believes 
Tunisia has been more successful, argues that it is due to the dynamics of both countries and 
the way in which women can be used for purpose of gaining more support. She claimed that 
this is the main reason why women’s rights have been more progressive in Tunisia and hence, 
why the democratic transition has been more prosperous. Additionally, Aliko stated that 
whilst Egypt and Tunisia might be similar in many ways, there are also big differences with 
regards to the complexity of political issues in each country.  
 
#6 So, you know that since Bourguiba, since the independence in 1956, 
[…]Women was always part of this kind of strategies and he shared this 
kind of state feminism approach where he used women’s issues to empower 
his own regime and also to have this effect encounter any Islamist kind of 
effect that might shake his rule. […] 
 
#6 You will find a totally different picture in Egypt for instance […] It's 
problematic in Egypt because Mubarak was not a feminist and he was not 
secular, and he was not interested in promoting women's rights. […] When 
Sisi came to power, it became even more dangerous. It is really dangerous 
when you use women’s issues, for your own gains and this is what Sisi has 
been doing systematically over the last five years.  
 
Furthermore, SKhiri argues from the perspective of the UN Women that the 30 percent of 
women that are now in office in Tunisia will result in increased chances for women to 
actually have meaningful influence on the decision-making in the country. However, similarly 
to the women of Egypt, she also notes that Tunisian women face challenges concerning 
traditional stereotypes and their traditional responsibilities. Thus, she emphasizes the 
importance of an inclusive approach, where men and boys, the civil society and women 
activists are involved in the development of women’s political participation and rights.   
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#7 So, we think that as the standard of the of 30 percent of presence of 
women is the percentage that could give the opportunity for women to 
influence the decisions. So, we are in a good path. 
 
#7 We see some obstacles sometimes a reluctance from women to accept to 
go for more responsibility because they have such a workload due to their 
responsibilities, their familial responsibility, all their duty that they 
continue to do even if they have no other responsibilities.  
 
#7 We have to continue the support to civil society directly to avoid any 
backlashes in gender equality attachments and we have to work more on 
social changes and work more with the youth. Work more with boys and 
girls, to ensure the most inclusive that we can do.  
 
5.2 Policy Documents  
#1&2 Article 53: Citizens are equal before the law, possess equal rights 
and public duties, and may not be discriminated against on the basis of 
religion, belief, sex, origin, race, color, language, disability, social class, 
political or geographical affiliation, or for any other reason.  
 
#3 Article 21: All citizens, male and female, have equal rights and duties, 
and are equal before the law without any discrimination. The state 
guarantees freedoms and individual and collective rights to all citizens, and 
provides all citizens the conditions for a dignified life 
 
The policy frameworks all include some similar provisions concerning women’s rights. All 
frameworks included at least one article stating that citizens have equal rights and 
opportunities before the law, including public rights without any discrimination. In addition to 
the Egyptian constitution granting women full citizenship for the first time (Article 6), it also 
entitles them to hold public posts and senior positions, such as ministers and judges, without 
discrimination. Similarly, the Tunisian constitution also grants women the right to run for 
office and higher positions without discrimination. However, it takes it one step further by 
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using the term “he/she” in the provisions relevant to the individual30 and by also stipulating 
that the state will ensure work on the basis of competence.   
 
#1&2 Article 11: The state commits to taking the necessary measures to 
ensure appropriate representation of women in the houses of parliament, in 
the manner specified by law. It grants women the right to hold public posts 
and high management posts in the state, and to appointment in judicial 
bodies and entities without discrimination.  
 
#3 Article 34: The rights to election, voting, and candidacy are guaranteed, 
in accordance with the law. The state seeks to guarantee women’s 
representation in elected bodies 
 
#3 Article 40: Work is a right for every citizen, male and female. The state 
shall take the necessary measures to guarantee work on the basis of 
competence and fairness. All citizens, male and female, shall have the right 
to decent working conditions and to a fair wage.  
 
The Egyptian constitution includes a 25 percent quota for women and another 25 percent 
quota for youth, including young females, in the local councils. It also ensures the 
commitment of the state to taking the necessary measure to increase women’s representation. 
Additionally, there is only one significant difference between the 2014 Egyptian constitution 
and the 2019 amendments with regards to women’s rights, namely, that it now includes a 
quota stipulation reserving 25 percent of the seats in parliament to women. Similarly, yet 
somewhat more progressive, the Tunisian constitution provides for a parity clause aiming at 
reaching equal representation of men and women in all elective assemblies.  
 
#1&2 Article 180: […] one quarter of the seats [in local councils] are 
allocated to youth under 35 years old, one quarter is allocated for women 
[…]  
                                               
30 For instance, Article 77 regarding the president states The President of the Republic is responsible for 
representing the state. He/she is responsible for determining the general state orientations in the domains of 
defence, foreign relations and national security in relation to protecting the state and the national territory from 
all internal and external threats, after consultation with the Head of Government 
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#2 Article 102: The House of Representatives is composed of no less than 
four hundred and fifty members elected by direct secret public ballot. At 
least one quarter of the seats shall be allocated to women.  
 
#3 Article 46: The state works to attain parity between women and men in 
elected Assemblies. 
 
Lastly, both the Egyptian constitution and the Tunisian constitution commits the state to 
ensure protection against all forms of violence, as well as the protection and care for women 
in, inter alia, motherhood and childhood. They also guarantee the state to ensure women’s 
empowerment by helping women balance her work with her duties towards the family, and by 
providing free education and eradicate illiteracy.  
 
#1&2 Article 11: The state commits to the protection of women against all 
forms of violence, and ensures women empowerment to reconcile the duties 
of a woman toward her family and her work requirements.  
 
#3 Article 46: The state commits to protect women’s accrued rights and 
work to strengthen and develop those rights […] The state shall take all 
necessary measures in order to eradicate violence against women 
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6 Analysis and Discussion of Results 
Based on the retrieved data, women in Egypt have enjoyed increasingly more rights after the 
2011 revolution. However, the overall perception is that women and men are still not 
considered equals. Despite previous research on perceptions of Egyptian men and women in 
the workforce arguing that men are better suited for certain positions and should be prioritised 
on the job market, the results of this study do not agree. Instead, it reaffirms the argument of 
the WPS agenda by showing that there is a belief that the inclusion of women tends to reduce 
levels of corruption and discrimination as well increase the effectiveness and sustainability of 
the decisions taken.  
   The material collected suggests that Egyptian women have always participated in the 
political sphere, but, their voices have not been given any meaningful consideration. The 
WPS agenda clearly state that in order for women to have meaningful influence in the 
political arena, it is important to have well-functioning institutions and a wider and dedicated 
commitment to increase the rights of women. However, it seems as if the Egyptian 
government has not, and is still not, fully prioritising the promotion or inclusion of women, be 
it politically or socially. This challenge for women is not new, nor is it limited to the case of 
Egypt. Previous studies31 found evidence that women’s rights in region is not developing 
because the issue is being sidelined by the process of regime change, lack of willingness of 
the government to include women in all aspect of society and gender-discriminating framing 
of the constitution.  
   Nevertheless, the 2019 amendments of the 2014 constitution include additional language 
stipulating a 25 percent quota for women in parliament and the local council. This is a 
positive development for Egyptian women, particularly considering that it before only 
included the vague formulation; “the state commits to taking the necessary measures to 
ensure appropriate representation of women in the houses of parliament32. Hence, it gave the 
legislator the responsibility to define what “appropriate” means. However, the question now 
is whether this is enough to actually facilitate women’s meaningful participation. Considering 
that theory argues that for real change to happen, there has to be at least a 30 percent 
representation of women, it is not surprising that some of the respondents are rather sceptical 
towards future developments. 
                                               
31 See for instance, Alves, 2015; Johansson-Nogués 2013 
32 Article 11 of the 2014 Egyptian constitution.  
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   Additionally, the results suggest that in order for women to actually have an influential 
voice and to contribute a successful democratic transition and in the long run political 
stability, certain measures have to be taken. Firstly, women need to be aware of their 
possibilities, rights and potentials. To reach this objective, awareness and encouragement 
programs, such as civic and education programs that include the important message of the 
WPS agenda, should be utilised. Considering that Egypt has announced that it will be 
developing a NAP on the WPS agenda, one can assume that this objective is feasible and a 
priority of the government.  
   Secondly, the institutional mechanisms that are currently in place have to be adjusted to 
further promote and enhance women’s political involvement. To reach this objective, 
additional quota systems should be put in place on all levels, including on the party level. 
Moreover, these quota systems should not include a limitation in the form of a minimum 
stipulation, and they should not be introduced alone. According to previous research33 and the 
opinion documents, one of the biggest challenges for women in the region, including in Egypt 
and Tunisia, is the presence of traditional stereotypes and gender roles. Therefore, it is argued 
that measures relieving women from their traditional obligations, such as child care and 
parental leave, are central to increase the capabilities of women in the political sphere.  
   Thirdly, similar to what has been stated in the WPS agenda, this research finds that there 
has to be a broader involvement of the whole society to promote women’s rights and 
participation. Therefore, it is essential to include both men and women as well as boys and 
girls in the discussion. Additionally, and what is noteworthy is that some of the respondents 
argued that men can bring about the same change as women, as long as they share the 
traditional values and morals of women. Consequently, the awareness and encouragement 
programs mentioned above, also need to target men and boys to further refute traditional 
stereotypes and increase the conduciveness of the advancement of women’s rights. 
   Fourthly, and similar to previous research34, this study finds that the framing of the current 
Egyptian constitution is too vague. The constitution needs to be more inclusive, distinctly 
formulated and aim to advance women’s rights. For instance, as Meyer-Resende and Song 
found in their studies, the vague language in the Egyptian constitution has resulted in 
interlocking institutions, which in turn has led to overlapping responsibilities and 
                                               
33  See for instance, Abu Ras et.al, 2012 
34  See Shash & Forden 2016; Johansson-Nogués 2013 
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accountability issues. Consequently, resulting in limited resources and pathways for women 
to seek justice. Additionally, women and girls are victims of sexual, physical and 
psychological violence and according to Song (2018;17-18) and the WPS framework, this 
impacts their abilities and willingness to engage in the public sphere. Therefore, to ensure the 
due process of law, the full respect and protection of human rights and the willingness and 
possibility for more women to engage in politics, the independence of all branches - 
executive, legislative and particularly judiciary- needs to be strengthened. As was concluded 
by Shash and Forden (2016:80-81), women’s rights cannot be fully respected unless it is 
prioritised, and accountability prevails.  
   Lastly, the results and previous research have highlighted the important roles of CSOs, 
NGOs and women activists in promoting change. Despite their currently being limited space 
and restrictions for actors working on somewhat controversial issues in Egypt, the 
institutional spaces which is granted to them within the constitution could be crucial if used 
effectively. This was for example evident in in Tunisia, where the pressure from the CSOs 
resulted in the adoption of the Tunisian NAP. Additionally, a strong united women’s 
movement, which stay visible whilst exerting a wider and consistent socio-political pressure 
on the current structures, might just be the key to a more gender equal society. Therefore, 
women and women’s movements, despite being secular or Islamist, must take advantage of 
their constitutional right and jointly call for change.  
   However, there are provisions within the constitution that provide for some of the measures 
mentioned above and despite the constitution being somewhat vaguely formulated, this study 
finds that one issue lies in the implementation, thus the matter of not prioritising women’s 
rights to the extent needed. Considering that the executive power of the president has 
increased with the 2019 amendments of the 2014 constitution, and based on the results 
retrieved, there is a reason to believe that these changes to the constitution will preserve the 
authoritarian nature of Egypt, hence, limiting the women’s participation further.  
   Nevertheless, the announcement made by Egypt on its decision to develop a NAP on the 
WPS agenda is a step in the right direction. As previous research and this study have argued, 
the provisions of the WPS framework are highly relevant for post-revolution countries. As the 
interviews were conducted before the announcement, the understanding of the framework 
might be different if one were to conduct the same interviews today. Nonetheless, it was 
evident that not all the respondents were aware of the meaning of the framework. The ones 
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that knew about the UNSC resolutions stated that the reason why Egypt has not yet drafted a 
NAP is that the country is not in an active conflict. In contrast, Tunisia has recognised the 
framework as relevant, even though it is not in active conflict. Hence, the WPS framework 
needs to be understood in a broader way and not be limited to only countries in active conflict 
or post-conflict settings. 
   The provisions of the WPS agenda are clearly relevant for Egypt as well, and even the 
Egyptian president, al-Sisi, stated “that the Egyptian state’s stability and progress will only be 
achieved by ensuring the active participation of women in all aspects of national work”35.  
When employing the WPS monitoring tool on the case of Egypt, it can be noted that the 
country already has made some efforts covered by some of the indicators. For instance, the 
constitution includes provisions that aims at protecting women’s and girls’ human rights, 
which is in line with indicator 5(b)36. Moreover, the provisions aiming at increasing women’s 
political participation in parliaments and ministerial positions are in accordance with indicator 
12(a)37. The country is also spearheading the work on the WPS in the region. Nonetheless, 
Egypt still has much to do before the WPS framework can be considered even partly 
implemented.   
   Comparing the case of Egypt with Tunisia; despite the development in Egypt not being as 
successful as the one in Tunisia, their respective constitutions are similar in many aspects 
concerning women’s rights. However, it appears as though the legal frameworks of Egypt has 
had more articles referring to women’s equal rights and participation than the frameworks of 
Tunisia, but why then has Tunisia progressed more than Egypt?  
   Firstly, Tunisia has had a longer history of women in decision-making positions and a 
bigger space for freedom of expression and civic rights. By applying the WPS framework, 
one can assume that this has made the political arena less discriminating and corrupt as well 
as more effective and sustainable. Additionally, Tunisia has managed to implement many of 
its constitutional provisions aiming at increasing women’s political participation, which has 
for instance been evident in the high representation of women in the parliament. Considering 
that previous research argues that Tunisia has managed to create a more balanced and distinct 
constitution than Egypt, it can be reasonable to assume that it is not only an issue of 
                                               
35 The quote is from the Strategy 2030, see the result section.  
36 See table 1: indicator 5(b) covers the “extent to which measures to protect women’s and girls’ human rights 
are included in national security policy frameworks” 
37 See table 1: indicator 12(b) covers “women’s political participation in parliaments and ministerial positions” 
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implementation of the constitution, but also an issue of ambiguous formulation. This is for 
instance evident in the provisions concerning women’s participation in parliament. The 
Egyptian constitution provides for a 25 percent quota, whilst Tunisian constitutions includes a 
parity clause between men and women. As the results of this thesis and the WPS agenda 
states, a quota stipulation with a baseline is only effective to some extent. Hence, the Tunisian 
measure, which aims at reaching equal representation of men and women in all elective 
assemblies, is more progressive than the one of Egypt. However, despite Tunisia generally 
performing better than Egypt, it has been evident that the actual situation in both countries do 
not live up to the progressive provisions of their respective constitutions.  
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7 Conclusion  
This research has attempted to study the impact women can have on post-Arab revolution countries’ 
transition to a democracy by analysing the challenges and opportunities for women’s political 
participation through the lenses of the UNSC agenda on Women, Peace and Security, in mainly 
Egypt. It has based its theoretical background on the belief that democracy promotes stability, but in 
order to reach democracy, the full inclusion of women in all aspects of society must be ensured.   
   The Egyptian democratic transition has been quite disruptive and considering the challenges Egypt 
is facing regarding its security and stability, both internal and external, it might not be too surprising 
that the situation in the country is tending to go backward rather than forward. The provision of the 
2019 constitutional amendments of the 2014 Egyptian constitution is centralising the power even 
further to the president, which contradicts the attempts of the decentralisation of the original 2014 
constitution. Consequently, Egypt is reinstating some of its former authoritarian nature. 
   This study finds that women tend to bring a more nuanced and balanced view into decision-
making processes. Additionally, the decisions taken are believed to be more effective and 
sustainable as well as less corrupt and discriminating, than if only men participate. However, 
their ability to contribute is limited in authoritarian states, where their voices are restricted, 
and their issues are not prioritised. Women are also faced with challenges concerning SGBV, 
traditional stereotypes and gender roles. However, based on the Egyptian constitution, there 
already exist some measures to facilitate women’s political participation, however, due to a 
possible gap in the implementation and ambiguity in the framing of the constitution, these 
measures have, thus far, not contributed to the progression of women’s roles in political 
decision-making. The results suggest that in order for women to actually have an influential 
voice and contribute to a successful democratic transition and in the long run political 
stability, certain measures have to be taken; 
   The constitution needs to be more inclusive, distinctly formulated and aim to advance 
women’s rights. For instance, the independence of the executive, legislative and particularly 
judiciary needs to be strengthened to ensure the due process of law, the full respect and 
protection of human rights and that more women can and want to engage in politics. 
Additionally, the institutional mechanisms that are currently in place have to be adjusted to be 
able to promote and enhance women’s political involvement. To reach this objective, 
additional quota systems, which do not include a limitation in the form of a minimum 
stipulation, should be put in place on all levels, including on the party level.  
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   Egypt would benefit from listening to women and actively working to promote women’s 
rights through, inter alia, gender mainstreaming on all levels, including through opening up 
spaces for CSOs, NGOs and in particularly women’s movements. These organisations and 
movements should jointly exert a wider and consistent socio-political pressure on the current 
structures for change to happen. Egypt should also refute stereotypes by invest in awareness 
and encouragement programs, such as civic and education programs, and provide support 
services that facilitate women’s participation, such as child care and parental leave. 
Additionally, the country should work to increase the awareness and understanding among 
men and boys to further refute traditional stereotypes and increase the conduciveness of the 
advancement of women’s rights.  
   In conclusion, the contemporary perception of women’s political participation in Egypt is 
rathe gloomy and the future perception of women’s political participation is uncertain. The 
most important question is whether women will be allowed meaningful participation in all 
aspects of society and particularly in politics. Either Egypt risk ending up in stagnation or, 
instead, women could be given an honest chance and meaningful roles to contribute to a 
successful democratic transition and in the long run political stability.  
 
7.1 Avenues for Future Research 
It will be fascinating to follow the future developments in both countries. Particularly 
considering that the current Tunisian president recently passed away, only two months before 
the new presidential election. It will also be interesting to follow Egypt’s work on the 
development of the NAP and whether, this will facilitate increased participation of women in 
politics and thus, a successful democratic transition and in the long run political stability.  
   As this research has taken a contemporary approach, it would be interesting to conduct a 
more historical study, where the method of explaining outcome process-tracing is employed 
to receive an understanding of the factors that have been of importance for the development 
of Egypt and Tunisia until today. It would also be fascinating to conduct this study in a 
broader context through a quantitative analysis to confirm the findings and also its 
generalisability. The independent variable would thus be women’s political participation, and 
the stability in authoritarian states undergoing a transition to democracy would be the 
dependent variable. The identified challenges and opportunities for women to participate 
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would constitute for interesting control variables. Lastly, considering that this study has 
argued that the WPS framework is highly relevant in the case of Egypt and since the country 
recently announced that it will be developing a NAP, it would be interesting to conduct this 
study again, however, a few years from now. This to see whether the WPS has had an impact 
in Egypt and whether the perceptions of women’s political participation have changed as a 
consequence of this. 
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9 Appendices  
9.1 Appendix 1: Condensed Quotations and Citations of Opinion Documents and Policy 
Documents  
All data, except for the interviews, are presented as citations in their original form. Interview 
quotes are presented in their condensed form for clarification purposes. For the purpose of 
having a clear overview of the data, the quotations and citations of the opinion documents are 
presented first and under each relevant subcategory that was identified in the analytical stage. 
See table 3 for the coding of the opinion documents.  
 
The Perception of Equal Participation Between Men and Women in Politics in Egypt:  
#2 No, of course they do not have equal participation. It’s not a critical problem, but I really 
believe that both men and women should be involved in politics. […] Women are a big 
proportion of the population, so they have to be involved in the political life. They should be 
involved in the political arena and they should be involved in every aspect, since they are a 
part of the country.  
 
#3 We do have a lot of progress when it comes to this. We have more than six ministers now 
who are women and they actually work on different topics that are not really the normal 
topics tackled by women in general. 
 
#4 […] So, so far at least I’m not seeing the parliament doing very much to support women’s 
rights. The other thing that is also in the constitution, is that in local councils there is a 
twenty-five percent seats for women, since the constitution was endorsed in 2014, we haven’t 
had local council elections, so it hasn’t happened yet. So, this is the level of political 
participation this is the picture so far.  
 
#5 During the past three years there has been huge improvement when it comes to women’s 
leaderships. So, you know that Egypt has eight women ministers and five deputy ministers 
which are all appointed by the president, we have one women governor and five deputy 
governors. So, these are things that was not usually seen before in the political arena and we 
   86 
also have the head of security who is a woman and the deputy governor of the bank who is a 
woman. These are very strong positions for women’s leadership. 
 
#8 Women remain the unsung heroes whose activism and courage continues to exceed all 
expectations, yet they still struggle to hold on to what little rights they have gained.  
 
#9 In spite of this progress, the Egyptian society still faces major challenges in empowering a 
wide base of women (p.5)  
 
The Perception of Women’s Roles in Politics in Egypt:  
#1 [Women’s roles are] hugely important. […] Having women is key and definitively useful. 
It doesn’t mean that it will translate automatically into gender sensitive policies or programs. 
There are some women that might not promote it that way, but it helps […] I wouldn’t try to 
emphasise too much of a gender type in this response either. Well it’s like some studies have 
proven that having more women can actually reduce the level of corruption at a 
governmental level and at national level, so there are like studies that prove that sometimes 
women being a part of it can bring different approaches to policy implementation or even in 
the process itself like corruption. They can bring different perspectives looking at maybe 
ensuring that financing is available for education, social care et cetera. So, yeah there is a 
different perspective that they can bring in that way. Generally, we think that women are 
more effective because they are the victims with their children of the conflict, they are more 
impacted by the conflict. The sense of urgency for it to stop and the sense of wellbeing and 
livelihood is kind of they carry that on their shoulders, and they want that change to happen 
because of that. 
 
#1 Basically, they [men] are going to discuss the power, how do they divide the power among 
themselves and how can they find a compromise that’s going to make them all feel satisfied 
with that little amount of power that they have divided. […] The truth is if you bring more 
women to the table they are actually going to say okay you have destroyed all of these 
hospitals, all of these schools and we don’t have any kind of police, community or system of 
protection, what are we going to do? They think about the future of the society, they think 
about the future of the population, they think about provision of services. So, they bring to the 
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table other things that are not often discussed and they bring also the kind of sense of 
urgency, like guys please we need to have peace now, everyone is suffering, we are tired of 
suffering, let’s find an agreement. So, they push people to find an agreement faster but an 
agreement that’s also lasting longer because it is more inclusive, more comprehensive in the 
dimensions of what it’s going to bring in terms of actually designing a future for the country 
 
#2 I believe that men and women can play the same roles, but if we talk about women 
specifically, I believe that in certain positions that serves social purposes, a woman might 
perform better, women do definitely improve the efficiency of decision-making processes 
because women bring certain points of view that might help. I believe that some places that 
attach more to the social benefits, such as family care and education and environmental 
affairs, a woman might perform better. 
 
#3 If we talk about women’s participation, it’s important to us because know this is the whole 
context for the participation pillar and to have sustainable peace process and to have women 
inclusion and to have these gender issues. This to stress their positive roles and their role as 
agents of peace and this is what we think is important as well. 
 
#4 The inclusion of women will make for a more balanced view […] It’s not about men and 
women, it’s about representation, it’s about having voics, it’s about saying that everyone, any 
society is diverse and the better representation for all voices, the better. It’s as simple as that. 
[…] I was a member of the committee that drafted the constitution in 2013 and it was 
endorsed in 2014, so this is the current constitution. During this constitution writing 
committee out of fifty there were five who were women, so this was just a ten percent 
representation […]. just having women in a committee or in parliament who are not 
advocates of women’s rights, becomes problematic. However, in this case, even though it was 
just ten percent, the five women members were advocates of women’s rights. and also, there 
was support from other members of the committee for women’s rights. So, actually the 
constitution has some really good articles that support women’s political participation. 
 
#5 The way I see it, is that they bring a different perspective, they bring a different experience 
and it’s always more enriching than just having only men. Maybe they come to the same 
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outcome as men, but definitely the outcome will be much richer and much more thoughtful, 
than if it is done by just by men.  
 
#8 Voices of women can help create better institutions and stronger instruments. Women’s 
voice is capable of accelerating a revamped cultural, social and legal infrastructure that 
guarantees peace and security for every citizen without any discrimination. 
 
#9 [Preamble]  In accordance with the Egyptian Constitution, which expresses the will of the 
Egyptian people and established the values of justice and equality, embracing the 
constitutional values of equal opportunities and the rights of women that it has set forth: […] 
and the belief that the Egyptian state’s stability and progress will only be achieved by 
ensuring the active participation of women in all aspects of national work [President al-Sisi’s 
Speech at the Celebration of the Egyptian Women’s Day 2017, 21 March 2017]  
 
Current Existing Measures Facilitating Women’s Political Participation:  
#1 I believe that there are no obstacles from the government, internal or external or at any 
level. I believe that men and women are provided with the same tools when it comes to 
education and the freedom to get involved with any part the ministry 
 
#4 […] So, so far at least I’m not seeing the parliament doing very much to support women’s 
rights. 
 
#5 In the country you have about a few millions of women who do not have an ID-card, 
meaning that there are two reasons for it, either that they have never had one and that they 
are a really fair minority or the ones that had ID-cards but they had to remove them because 
they have time-span and limits and for different reasons some do not know how to go about it, 
some might have difficulties to renew it so it’s not necessarily made deliberate but just that 
they fall of the grid. The cards are important, especially for the population that doesn’t have 
that card are really at the grassroot vulnerable and they actually need it for accessing social 
services, for accessing grants, additional grants for health services. It’s also important to 
them to really be citizens of this country and exercise their rights as a citizen. There are big 
efforts put forward by the government […]  under the leadership of the National Council for 
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Women and the Ministry of Interior which equips those women with the ID-cards and 
integrates them in the national programs.  
 
5# I think that one of them is this presidential youth and leadership program and I don’t know 
the quotas for women, but I know that for a fact one of the deputy governor who is a women 
comes from that pool so I think that is one.  
 
Current Existing Obstacles for Women’s Political Participation in Egypt:  
#2 I believe that it has something more to do with the mentality of the people here. They are 
not used to having women participating in politics and it might take time for everyone to 
support this kind of idea of being involved in political life. I believe that there are no 
obstacles from the government, internal or external or at any level. I believe that men and 
women are provided with the same tools when it comes to education and the freedom to get 
involved with any part the ministry. I believe that the only obstacle for women could be the 
social life here in Egypt, like the home and the family et cetera. A woman needs a different 
lifestyle to participate in such matters.  
 
#4 I would argue that we always need political will. Also, there are all sorts of traditions, 
obviously there are cultural problems, but I would highlight the political problems that 
support the argument that women’s issues are not a priority. So, there’s always some reason 
to justify not prioritizing women’s rights and that’s a political and not a social obstacle. It’s 
difficult to say, but on the individual level, because obviously women are affected by the 
culture so yes there are obstacles to women taking initiative to, for example, run for 
parliament because it’s very difficult. So far it has been a man’s world in that area, and I 
would say that maybe women might hesitate. […] In a dictatorship you don’t have strong 
social movements right, because you basically don’t have spaces for independent people to 
operate.  
 
#5 in the country you have about a few millions of women who do not have an ID-card, 
meaning that there are two reasons for it, either that they have never had one and that they 
are a really fair minority or the ones that had ID-cards but they had to remove them because 
they have time-span and limits and for different reasons some do not know how to go about it, 
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some might have difficulties to renew it so it’s not necessarily made deliberate but just that 
they fall of the grid. The cards are important, especially for the population that doesn’t have 
that card are really at the grassroot vulnerable and they actually need it for accessing social 
services, for accessing grants, additional grants for health services. It’s also important to 
them to really be citizens of this country and exercise their rights as a citizen  
 
#5 The two things that I’ve noticed, I mean for me it’s definitely the mentality, do not take 
Egypt out of the concept of patriarchy. You cannot take Egypt out of the context that the 
political participation as the overall participation across areas, it is dominated by men, and 
it’s not only with regards to the political participation. I think patriarchy is one. I definitely 
think that we need the double burden as a certain part, meaning that don’t forget that the 
women is working at home globally 2.6 times more than a man, so don’t think that because 
you’re doing your job at the parliament that somebody else is doing your other jobs at home. 
I think this is really a social issue, the problem is that no one is relieving her from her other 
duties that she has. So that actually it has to do with education and the overall levels of 
engagement there.  
 
#6 Women participated more than men in the last three elections in Egypt. They participate, 
but they don't run for positions. They don't run, because they know that they're not going to 
win because they don't have the means. And because of the authoritarian nature of their 
regime, men are not giving them a chance to run. It is because of those hungry for power, the 
top, they don't want to leave any space for the women to have any kind of say in decision-
making process. What is true, is that those on the top are controlling the power making at the 
top and they're not letting women run from the very beginning and this is why there are no 
women running. And this is why voters are not voting for them. […] It's very difficult for 
women in these contexts to focus on issues that are not service related and things that are not 
what the others and male MPs are doing. So, you want to stay, and you want to get re-elected 
and they want to serve their constituents the way the male MPs are doing in this clientelist 
regimes. So, it's more about providing services rather than pushing for real issues for women, 
something like gender-based violence or issues that related to divorce, or guardianship or 
laws like that.  
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#9 The Egyptian society witnessed transformations that propagate negative values, fostering 
an inferior view of women in society over the past few decades, adding to the challenges of 
women’s empowerment, which are reflected in the increased waves of violence against 
women. compromising their dignity. besides the misinterpretation of religious texts that 
downplay women’s ability to contribute to the public sphere, limiting their roles to only 
family formation and reproduction (p.11)  
 
Measures That Should Be Put in Place to Facilitate Women’s Political Participation in 
Egypt:  
#1 Quotas are often set forward as a preliminary step to increase women’s participation, so 
like having quotas in the list of women who are participating in like different parties, who 
have been participating in the election, quotas for the government nominations for the 
ministry, for the ministers.[…] It doesn’t mean again and that was what I was saying 
previously that that’s going to translate automatically in gender sensitive outcomes, […] if 
you have, for instance, within a parliament more than thirty percent women, there is an 
automatically sort of change and impact from that gender perspective into the law making. 
[…] if you have quotas and to increase women’s participation it should be also supported by 
programs that you know support women locally to present themselves as candidates, to 
encourage women to take certain positions and promote them in doing so. It’s also like 
providing them with technical support, enhancing their voices et cetera. You should always 
when you mention a quota say “a minimum of” to ensure that it can always be higher so 
people don’t limit themselves to twenty percent […] If you’re looking at kind of more long-
term measures, it’s ensuring from the beginning that women have access to education, that 
they are encourage to pursue certain levels of degree, that they are encouraged to join 
politics by actually having a discourse that is open to women, that they have role models. […] 
Like small incentives, […] support for like babysitting the children.  
 
#2 Childcare is definitely a measure that could help. First of all, women need to want to be 
involved. It begins with the willingness of women to get involved. I believe that we need more 
awareness programs for women, to make them aware that they should be involved.  
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#4 Quotas have been one method to address the obstacles facing women […] also there are 
other things that can be done so this is the responsibility of the State obviously. I mean you 
see quotas are not just in parliament, you can have quotas on many different levels, you can 
have them at the level of local councils, at the level of parties. […] It can be organized to 
make sure that women are not for example put on top of election lists, so yes they have 
fulfilled the quota stipulation but women have been added at the end of the list, so at the end 
of the day it’s only  members who are at the top of the lists who will get elected and so on. So, 
there are many things that can be done definitely […]  
 
#5 Politically, there is a national institute for management that is looking at actually 
supporting women’s leaderships programs and how to boost the women’s leadership more 
from the government procedures but also from the general procedures that support women’s 
leaderships in public systems. Now if we bring this conversation at the more grassroot level, 
what we hear is that there is huge national efforts input in terms increasing women’s 
citizenships [by providing ID-cards].  
 
#5 First, we need to find women, second to make them interested in that, third to support them 
to take the office and fourthly, support them to keep that function and help them with the 
double burden at home and other job that they have on the side. So, there are programs 
working on that and trying to expand the pool of women interested in the local government. 
From there they will move to being more practical agents in the society. I’m a believer that 
everything for increasing the civic engagement, being in general politics or just being in civic 
just the engagement, comes with empowerment. So, if you ask me what the key to 
empowerment is, it’s from the education and civic empowerment activities. I think that they 
are all interrelated, so the education gives you the space, the culture, the opportunity to be 
out first of all.  
 
#6 I am an institutionalist. I do believe in institutions and how you structure your rules and 
your laws. […] I believe that if the government and if the decision-makers are serious about 
including women in politics and in decision-making process, there are specific measures to be 
done. Quota systems and quota systems that are well enforced and well designed. If you have 
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party lists, so women have to be on half of these lists, and they have to alternate when it 
comes to who comes on the top of the list.  
 
#9 In order to do so [empower women], the Strategy focuses on achieving the following: 1. 
Women’s political empowerment and promoting their leadership roles through encouraging 
all forms of political participation, including parliamentary representation and 
representation in local councils; eliminating discrimination against women holding senior 
positions in executive and judicial institutions; and enabling them to succeed in these posts; 
2. Women’s economic empowerment through capacity development, entrepreneurship, and 
equal opportunities for the women’s employment in all sectors, including the private sector 
and besides holding key positions in public institutions and companies;[…] Change the 
culture of society and challenging the stereotypes of women propagated by the media;  
Regard women’s empowerment as a collective responsibility that men and boys must also 
assume;  Support women to realize their full legal rights, with special attention to the rights 
of marginalized, poor and disabled women, and amending existing personal status laws to 
guarantee the rights of women, enhancing the chances of family cohesion;  Renew the 
religious discourse concerning women’s roles in the public domain and their right to hold 
public posts(p. 21-22)  
 
#9 Interventions for strengthening the leadership roles of Egyptian women and their political 
empowerment: Promote the role of women as voters: Expand the issuance of national 
identification cards for all women in all governorates (p.30) .[…] Protect the rights of 
working women and providing support services: Enforce the laws that protect working 
women and guarantee their rights with regard to working hours, maternity leave and equal 
wages, particularly in the private sector; […] Provide support services for working women, 
pursuant to Article 11 of the Constitution, like childcare services (time for breastfeeding and 
daycare) and providing protection both in the work environment and beyond (p.40). […] 
Adopting policies, planning approaches and budgets responsive to women’s needs is one of 
the most effective methods to bring about social change; […] The Strategy affirms the 
necessity of engaging civil society organizations in implementing its programs and activities, 
especially Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (p. 61-62) 
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Expected Development of Women’s Political Participation in Egypt:  
#2 I believe that in the upcoming decade it’s going to be much better and women will be 
involved more, because people are getting more aware of the idea of having women in 
politics.  
 
#4 There has to be a decision to prioritize women’s issues. So, things don’t change on their 
own, but you have to have a strong women’s movement that support these changes […] If the 
conditions are conducive to running fair elections, I think women will get involved absolutely 
 
#5 I think we are in the right track when it comes to the political will for the upcoming years 
and then imagine if, for example, we have one governor and  in five years we will have five 
governors, because we have now a pool of five deputy governors, so I’m thinking that it 
would be a normal path.  
 
#6 In Egypt the next years I think, given the political atmosphere that they're operating under, 
I think that they will continue navigating their way within the parameters of the authoritarian 
regime that is still in place. I really hope that they will be able now, since there is 25 percent 
women in parliament. I really hope that they can't come together and push for legislations, 
for women. There are so many serious issues in Egypt that involve women that need to be 
addressed […]  and since they're numerically more, I really hope that we can work together 
and have a stance on these issues and I really hope also that for both countries [Egypt and 
Tunisia] to be able to form some kind of a woman caucus to empower and kind of coordinate 
activities of women within these legislative bodies.  
 
#9 Its success depends on the active participation of all social groups, especially men and 
boys, besides all State institutions and its executive bodies (p.7) […] Vision By 2030, 
Egyptian women will become active contributors to the achievement of sustainable 
development in a nation that guarantees their constitutional rights, ensures 
their full protection, and provides- without discrimination- political, social, and economic 
opportunities that enable them to develop their capacities and achieve their full potential. 
Reproduction (p.21)  
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Current Measures in Line with the WPS Agenda in Egypt: 
#1 Egypt, they don’t have a 1325 action plan and their kind of approach to it is that they 
don’t really need one. They don’t consider it applies to them. I mean usually, from looking at 
other countries as well whenever a country doesn’t want it it’s because they associate it with 
conflict, and they don’t consider themselves at conflict, but indirectly they are focusing a lot 
on women’s participation. which is one of the pillars. They are also working on kind of 
recovery with assistance to refugees seeking refuge, so they are touching upon some of these 
pillars, but it is always indirectly it’s not directly in terms of implementing 1325. 
 
#3 If you want to talk nationally, I don’t think we can do that, again the context is conflict and 
post-conflict and Egypt is not in that situation […] because our center is an international 
center but it’s under the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most of the time we work on 
the implementation of the women peace and security agenda in the region and in Africa, 
including 1325 and its four pillars and including of course the participation pillar. You know 
the concept of 1325, is the conflict and post-conflict area, so our work is mainly directed 
towards African countries in conflict and the Arab region […]. Our role in the center is to 
make sure that this representation is actually meaningful and effective and that it’s not only 
based on gender issues. The idea is not just to have women on the table but to have women on 
the table discussing various issues, [...], but because we are talking about 1325, we are 
talking about conflict areas and you know the conflict does change a lot of their roles.  
 
#5 Egypt has not worked deliberately on 1325, like labelling it like it’s 1325. There was a lot 
done until 2010 actually. Egypt was even spearheading the efforts of the region in developing 
a regional strategy for 1325. I don’t think we can talk about implementation yet except from 
the awareness racing advocacy plans workshops et cetera. […] We are working with the 
government towards opening a conversation on 1325. Since 2011, Egypt has gone through 
three rounds of change, so we are opening avenues for conversation regarding what it takes 
and what doesn’t take, why we need a national action plan. There is always a need for a 
national action plan and then we can work even if you don’t have a plan on certain issues. We 
need to change that mindset to be honest. I think that one of the problems we have had with 
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the countries in the Arab region was that we are not in a conflict why do we need that. I think 
Egypt will consider it.  
 
#8 As someone who has championed the cause of women and children’s rights for over a 
decade, I was personally fascinated and overly joyed to see the development of a 
comprehensive strategy initiated by a UN resolution which was ground-breaking in more 
ways than one. […] We can see this in the way 1325 catered for the following: The 
participation of women and gender parity at all levels of decision-making, The protection and 
respect of human rights of girls and women […] We [Egypt] need to formulate a national 
plan of action which targets the implementation of the relevant UN resolutions. We must also 
review national legislation and harmonize it with international HR [Human 
Rights] conventions. It is also important to promote a culture of peace and tolerance through 
education. We must build the capacities of professionals involved in the implementation of the 
resolutions and we must enhance monitoring and reporting mechanisms We need to allocate 
adequate human and financial resources and establish a genuine and transparent partnership 
with civil society. Finally, we need to raise awareness of Security Council resolutions and 
that gender-based violence is not a soft issue and this includes strengthening the perception 
of women as peace makers and agents for change not only as victims. 
 
Egypt vs. Tunisia: 
 
#5 Egypt is a very strong positive example for the Arab States, but also for Africa and the 
African Union. But also Tunisia because, Tunisia has made huge progress and especially on 
some of the laws are like amazing, but Egypt is another country with a lot of other dynamics 
and the population is much bigger and more complex, but the disability and inheritance law 
are huge steps in the right direction and Egypt has the passing of nationality to the children 
from the mother’s some of the countries still have from the fathers 
 
#6 In Tunisia, the 2014 constitution they did the parity clause, so a little bit different from 
what Egypt is introducing right now. […] the quota, which actually dates way back more than 
the 1325 resolution. So, you know that since Bourguiba, since the independence in 1956, […] 
he was really worried about the Islamist and he was worried that they will take over, so he 
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started using women’s rights to counter Islamism in the country and the tribal structure of the 
country too. So, since 1956 you know the code of personal status that he introduced […], was 
that he introduced in order to empower women and curb the effect of Islamism and this was a 
trend. Women was always part of this kind of strategies and he shared this kind of state 
feminism approach where he used women’s issues to empower his own regime and also to 
have this effect encounter any Islamist kind of effect that might shake his rule. And then what 
happened in 1999, there was a huge discussion around quota systems and […] since 2004 
women’s representation in Tunisia was always anywhere between 25, 30, 31 percent, […] 
Women's movements were very active, and they were doing great work pushing and pushing 
for changes, but most of the implementation, most of the decisions were taking at the top. 
After the 2011 revolution […] you will see how sophisticated the women's movements and 
those who are working on the constitution were when it comes to women's rights […]So, in 
2014, you know in the constitution they said, we must have a disparity clause and women 
have to be equal to men in all leadership positions. But when it came to implementation […] 
the fact that women did not achieve more than 30 percent, in the 2014 elections. So, what 
happened in the 2014 elections, […] So, they said okay we learned our lesson from this 
election, we should have done zipper quota and also a vertical quota. So, in the upcoming 
election which I think is in 2019 they will have also a vertical quota to balance the lists. […] 
Some national elections last year where the vertical quota was implemented on the 
subnational level was so much more successful. […] I think in Tunisia the women’s 
representation; well I think you reach a point where you don't need to be more numerical kind 
of increase in their numbers. I hope that the focus will be on the quality of representation 
rather than the quantity of women in power […] 
 
#6 You will find a totally different picture in Egypt for instance, […] when during the 
constitution writing process women's movements were almost absent from the constitution 
writing, […]  because Islamists work dominating the constitution writing process. […] what 
we're seeing in Egypt over the last 10 years, it's really problematic in a way that women's 
issues were not part of Mubarak's agenda. But if you look at Ben Ali, it was a priority for him 
because he was a secular leader and he wanted to garner women's support. It was one of his 
priorities not because he believes in women's issues. All these rulers don't give anything 
about women or their rights, but they were using them to empower their own routines. It's 
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problematic in Egypt because Mubarak was not a feminist and he was not secular, and he 
was not interested in promoting women's rights. […]  There were not any organizations 
working on empowering women in politics versus Tunisia where they have lots of 
organizations, international organizations too, working on women in politics and training 
them. […] The women's movements were so scattered and add to that, they became so 
polarized between the Islamists fight and the secular and so add to the fragmentation of the 
women's movement in Egypt before the uprising, after the uprising a new dimension was 
added which has a religious dimension. And who is with the Islamists and who is with the 
secular or the nationalist whatever you want to call them. So, now they're further fragmented. 
They were excluded from the constitution writing not because the constitution writers made it 
intentionally. No, because the women's movements never came together with a coherent 
agenda, to push on the constitution writers. […] what he just did during the 2015 election, so 
the new amendment was ratified last week, it did remain 25 percent quota in the national 
legislator too, so now it’s just a constitutional quota […] When Sisi came to power, it became 
even more dangerous. It is really dangerous when you use women’s issues, to use women for 
your own gains and this is what Sisi has been doing systematically over the last five years. So, 
he keeps on appealing to women, but the problem is that he appeals without giving women 
anything in return. […]  And I don't know when women will stop supporting him or when they 
can become sophisticated enough to understand what's going on and they start negotiating 
right with the regime. There is not a structure, a unified voice that can even run this kind of 
negotiations. […] There is this other issue that we have, the Islamists were dominating the 
elections over the last year in Egypt and Islamists they don’t run women. So, they rely on 
women to make them win and to do campaigning for them, but they don't put them on their 
lists. The other problem, the NDP which was Mubarak's regime and Mubarak's party before 
the revolution, the NDP did not care about women and they did not have any quota for 
women like the Tunisians RCD. So that's why there were barely any women in the Egyptian 
Assembly.  
 
#7 So, we think that as the standard of the of 30 percent of presence of women is the 
percentage that could give the opportunity for women to influence the decisions. So, we are in 
a good path. […] we have 48 percent of women participation on the municipal level. After the 
election, each council at municipal level they elect their head of the council and after we 
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ended up with 19 women heading the municipalities in all of the country. […] I think that 
there are clear and concrete steps that shows that there is a clear influence or a will to 
support women’s participation in many thematics, but also to provide specific programs and 
action plans centered on women's rights. 
 
#7 We see some obstacles sometimes a reluctance from women to accept to go for more 
responsibility because they have such a workload due to their responsibilities, their familial 
responsibility, all their duty that they continue to do even if they have no other 
responsibilities. So, the very traditional tasks done by women. The traditional tasks that 
women are doing are still expected to be done by women. This is this is an obstacle and it 
depends on the different region because sometimes in some areas some people do not expect 
to have a woman leading in some other parts of the country.   
 
#7 We have to continue the support to civil society directly to avoid any backlashes in gender 
equality attachments and we have to work more on social changes and work more with the 
youth. Work more with boys and girls, to ensure the most inclusive that we can do. […] We 
have to find ways to secure advocacy, to work for gender equality within the parties. I think 
this should be a way to influence political parties so that their decision in voting and different 
laws is gender sensitive and not gender blind. 
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9.2 Appendix 2: Citations of Policy Documents  
The relevant articles of the policy documents are presented continuously, starting with the 
Egyptian constitution and ending with Tunisian constitution. For the coding of the policy 
documents see table 4.  
 
#1&2 Article 4: Sovereignty belongs to the people alone, which exercises it and protects it. 
They are the source of power. They safeguard their national unity, which is based on the 
principle of equality, justice and equal opportunity between citizens, as provided in this 
Constitution.  
 
#1&2 Article 9: The state ensures equal opportunity for all citizens without discrimination. 
 
#1&3 Article 11: The state commits to achieving equality between women and men in all 
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution. The state commits to taking the necessary measures to ensure appropriate 
representation of women in the houses of parliament, in the manner specified by law. It grants 
women the right to hold public posts and high management posts in the state, and to 
appointment in judicial bodies and entities without discrimination. The state commits to the 
protection of women against all forms of violence, and ensures women empowerment to 
reconcile the duties of a woman toward her family and her work requirements. The state 
ensures care and protection and care for motherhood and childhood, and for breadwinning, 
and elderly women, and women most in need.  
 
#1&2 Article 19: Every citizen has the right to education with the aim of building the 
Egyptian character, maintaining national identity, planting the roots of scientific thinking, 
developing talents, promoting innovation and establishing civilizational and spiritual 
values and the concepts of citizenship, tolerance and non- discrimination. The state 
commits to uphold its aims in education curricula and methods, and to provide 
education in accordance with global quality criteria. Education is obligatory until the end of 
the secondary stage or its equivalent. The state grants free education in different stages in 
state educational institutions as per the law. 
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#1&2 Article 25: Illiteracy The state commits to developing a comprehensive plan to 
eradicate alphabetical and digital illiteracy for all citizens from all age groups. It commits to 
developing implementation mechanisms with the participation of civil society institutions 
according to a specific timeline.  
 
#1&2 Article 27: […] The economic system is socially committed to ensuring equal 
opportunities and a fair distribution of development returns, to reducing the gaps between 
incomes by setting a minimum wage and pension to ensure a decent life, and setting a 
maximum wage in state agencies for whoever works for a wage as per the law.  
 
#1&2 Article 53: Citizens are equal before the law, possess equal rights and public duties, 
and may not be discriminated against on the basis of religion, belief, sex, origin, race, color, 
language, disability, social class, political or geographical affiliation, or for any other 
reason. Discrimination and incitement to hate are crimes punishable by law. The state shall 
take all necessary measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and the law shall 
regulate the establishment of an independent commission for this purpose.  
 
#1&2 Article 72: The state shall ensure the independence of all press institutions and owned 
media outlets, in a way that ensures their neutrality and expressing all opinions, political and 
intellectual trends and social interests; and guarantees equality and equal opportunity in 
addressing public opinion.  
 
#1&2 Article 74: Citizens have the right to form political parties by notification as regulated 
by the law. No political activity may be exercised or political parties formed on the basis of 
religion, or discrimination based on sex, origin, sect or geographic location, nor may any 
activity be practiced that is hostile to democracy, secretive, or which possesses a military or 
quasi-military nature 
 
#1&2 Article 75: Right to establish associations Citizens have the right to form non-
governmental organizations and institutions on a democratic basis, which shall acquire legal 
personality upon notification. They shall be allowed to engage in activities freely. 
Administrative agencies shall not interfere in the affairs of such organizations, dissolve them, 
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their board of directors, or their board of trustees except by a judicial ruling. The 
establishment or continuation of non-governmental organizations and institutions whose 
structure and activities are operated and conducted in secret, or which possess a military or 
quasi-military character are forbidden, as regulated by law.  
 
#1&2 Article 180: Every local unit elects a local council by direct, secret ballot for a term of 
four years. A candidate must be no younger than 21 years old. […] one quarter of the seats 
are allocated to youth under 35 years old, one quarter is allocated for women, workers and 
farmers are represented by no less than 50 percent of the total number of seats, and these 
percentages include a proper representation of Christians and people with disability. […]  
 
 #2 Article 102: First paragraph: The House of Representatives is composed of no less than 
four hundred and fifty members elected by direct secret public ballot. At least one quarter of 
the seats shall be allocated to women.  
 
#3 [Preamble] With a view to building a republican, democratic and participatory system, in 
the framework of a civil state founded on the sovereignty of the people, exercised through the 
peaceful alternation of power through free elections, and on the principle of the separation 
and balance of powers, which guarantees the freedom of association in conformity with the 
principles of pluralism, an impartial administration, and good governance, which are the 
foundations of political competition, where the state guarantees the supremacy of the law and 
the respect for freedoms and human rights, the independence of the judiciary, the equality of 
rights and duties between all citizens, male and female, and equality between all regions,  
 
#3 Article 21: All citizens, male and female, have equal rights and duties, and are equal 
before the law without any discrimination. The state guarantees freedoms and individual and 
collective rights to all citizens, and provides all citizens the conditions for a dignified life 
. 
#3 Article 34: The rights to election, voting, and candidacy are guaranteed, in accordance 
with the law. The state seeks to guarantee women’s representation in elected bodies 
 
#3 Article 39: Education shall be mandatory up to the age of sixteen years. The state 
guarantees the right to free public education at all levels and ensures provisions of the 
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necessary resources to achieve a high quality of education, teaching, and training. It shall 
also work to consolidate the Arab-Muslim identity and national belonging in the young 
generations, and to strengthen, promote and generalize the use of the Arabic language and to 
openness to 
 
#3 Article 40: Work is a right for every citizen, male and female. The state shall take the 
necessary measures to guarantee work on the basis of competence and fairness. All citizens, 
male and female, shall have the right to decent working conditions and to a fair wage.  
 
#3 Article 46: The state commits to protect women’s accrued rights and work to strengthen 
and develop those rights. The state guarantees the equality of opportunities between women 
and men to have access to all levels of responsibility in all domains. The state works to attain 
parity between women and men in elected Assemblies. The state shall take all necessary 
measures in order to eradicate violence against women. 
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9.3 Appendix 3: Interview Guide38  
Name of respondent: 
 
Personal information  
1. In which age category would you place yourself?  
>25    25<40   40<55      or 55<  
 
2. What is your educational background?  
3. What is your profession and how long have you been at your current position?  
 
4. How important do you think women’s political participation is? 
4.1 Are there any downsides to including more women in political life? 
 
5. Do you think that women and men in general have different roles to play in politics? 
 
6. What is your perception of the equal representation of men and women in politics in 
Egypt/Tunisia?  
6.1 Do you think men and women have equal representation in politics in Egypt/Tunisia?  
6.2 If no, do you think that it is an issue?  
6.3 If no, how do you think that women’s political participation can be improved?  
 
7. Are there any obstacles facing women’s participation in politics on all levels in 
Egypt/Tunisia (local, national, international)?  
7.1 Which are these obstacles, please elaborate? (Gender, class, economic indicators, 
culture, other.) 
 
8. Do you know of any current programmes or structures that facilitate women’s 
political participation and representation in Egypt/Tunisia?  
 
                                               
38 The same interview guide was used for all interviews, however, the questions regarding Tunisia were only 
applied to interviews were it was known that the respondent had knowledge about Tunisia.    
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9. Can you think of any other measures that would help increase women’s political 
participation in Egypt/Tunisia?  
 
 
10. Describe your view of women’s participation in decision-making processes in the 
Egyptian/Tunisian society? 
10.1 Would you say that the increased inclusion of women in politics would impact the 
efficiency of decision-making processes?  
10.2 Do you think that the increased political participation of women would contribute to 
the stability and further development of the society of Egypt/Tunisia?  
 
11. Could you tell me what the Egyptian/Tunisian government is doing to enhance 
women’s political participation in decision-making? 
11.1 Are there any good practices, in the sense of support, that can help advance women’s 
political participation?   
 
12. What do you know about Security Council Resolution 1325 that was adopted in 
2000? 
 
13. What steps has the government in Egypt/Tunisia taken to implement the resolution 
1325?  
13.1 Is there a national action plan on the implementation of resolution 1325?  
 
14. Do you think that there are there any gaps on the current approach towards the 
implementation of resolution 1325 in Egypt/Tunisian?  
 
15. How do you think the women’s political representation in Egypt/Tunisia will change 
in the upcoming decade?  
 
Closing up 
16. Quick summary of the interview? Have I understood everything correctly?  
17. Is there something else you want to add? 
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9.4 Appendix 4: 2019 Amendments to the 2015 Egyptian Constitution   
 
2014 Constitution Amendments 
Article (102) First paragraph 
The House of Representatives is composed of no less than 
four hundred and fifty members elected by direct secret 
public ballot. 
Article (102) First paragraph  
The House of Representatives is composed of no less than 
four hundred and fifty members elected by direct secret 
public ballot. At least one quarter of the seats shall be 
allocated to women. 
Article (102) Third paragraph 
Other candidacy requirements, the electoral system, and 
division of electoral constituencies shall be defined by law in 
a manner which observes fair representation of the population 
and governorates and equitable representation of voters. 
Elections based on the plurality voting system or proportional 
list, or a combination of both at whatsoever ratio may be 
adopted. 
Article (102) Third paragraph  
Other candidacy requirements, the electoral system, and 
division of electoral constituencies shall be defined by law in 
a manner which observes fair representation of the population 
and governorates. Elections based on the plurality voting 
system or proportional list, or a combination of both at 
whatsoever ratio may be adopted. 
 
Article (244 bis) Addendum  
The provisions of the first paragraph of Article 102 shall 
apply as of the next legislative chapter. 
Article (140) First paragraph 
The president shall be elected for a period of four calendar 
years, commencing from the day following the termination of 
the term of his predecessor. The president may only be 
reelected once. 
Article (140) First paragraph  
The president shall be elected for a period of six calendar 
years, commencing from the day following the termination 
of the term of his predecessor. The president may not hold 
office for more than two consecutive terms. 
 
Article (241 bis) Addendum 
The current presidential term, as per the proposed 
amendments, shall end six years after the announcement of 
the results of the presidential elections in 2018. The current 
president shall have the right to be re-elected once. 
 
Article (151 bis) Addendum 
The President of the Republic may appoint one vice president 
or more, determine their competencies, and may delegate 
them in some of his duties, relieve them of their posts, and 
accept their resignation. The Vice-Presidents of the Republic 
shall take the oath before assuming office Provided for in 
article 144 of the Constitution before the President of the 
Republic. The provisions of the Constitution shall apply to 
the Vice-Presidents of the Republic in articles 141, 144, 145, 
148 and 173. The president may also dismiss or accept the 
resignation of the vice president. 
Article (160) First paragraph 
In case the President of the Republic is temporarily prevented 
from assuming his powers, the Prime Minister shall act in his 
place. 
Article (160) First paragraph 
In case the President of the Republic is temporarily prevented 
from assuming his powers, such powers shall be given to his 
vice president or by the prime minister when there is no vice-
president or when the vice-president cannot replace the 
president. 
Article (160) Last paragraph 
The interim President may not run for presidency or request 
any amendment to the Constitution or dissolve the House of 
Representatives or dismiss the Government. 
Article (160) Last paragraph 
The interim president or whoever temporarily assumes 
presidency may not request any amendment to the 
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Constitution, dissolve the House of Representatives, dismiss 
the Government or run for the presidency. 
Article (185) 
Each judicial body or organization shall manage its own 
affairs, and shall have an independent budget, the 
components of which shall be fully examined by the House 
of Representatives. Upon its approval, this budget shall be 
included in the State budget under one budget line. Each 
judicial body or organization shall be consulted with regards 
to the bills regulating its affairs. 
Article (185) 
Each judicial body or organization shall manage its own 
affairs, shall be consulted concerning the draft laws 
regulating its affairs; each of them shall have an independent 
budget. The President of the Republic shall appoint the heads 
of the judicial bodies or organizations, out of the oldest seven 
deputies of each of the heads, for a period of four years, or 
until their retirement age, whichever is earlier, and for one 
time throughout their terms of office, as regulated by law. 
A supreme council for the judicial bodies or organizations 
headed by the President of the Republic shall hold their 
common affairs. The members of the council would include 
the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the heads of 
the judicial bodies or organizations, the head of Cairo Appeal 
Court, and the Attorney-General. 
The council shall have a secretary who is appointed by the 
President of the Republic for a period of time specified by the 
law and alternately between the members of the council. 
In the absence of the President of the Republic, he shall be 
replaced temporarily by who he authorizes from among the 
heads of the bodies or organizations. 
The council shall be competent to consider the conditions of 
appointing, promoting and disciplining members of bodies or 
organizations. The council’s opinion shall be taken on the 
draft laws regulating the affairs of these bodies and 
organizations. Decisions shall be issued with the approval of 
a majority of its members. 
Article (189) second paragraph 
The Prosecutor General shall be in charge of the Public 
Prosecution. He shall be chosen by the Supreme Council of 
the Judiciary from among those ranked as Vice presidents of 
the Court of Cassation, or from those ranked as Presidents of 
the Courts of Appeal or from the Assistants to 
the Prosecutor General. He shall be appointed by virtue of a 
Presidential Decree for four years or for the remaining years 
until he reaches the age of retirement whichever is earlier, and 
this appointment shall be only once during his term of 
service. 
Article (189) second paragraph 
The Prosecutor General shall be in charge of the Public 
Prosecution. He shall be chosen by the President of the 
Republic out of three nominees from the Supreme Judicial 
Council, the deputy heads of the Court of Cassation and the 
heads of the courts of appeal and the assistant attorneys for a 
period of four years or until reaching retirement age, 
whichever is earlier. 
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Article (190) 
The State Council is an autonomous judicial body, and it shall 
have the exclusive jurisdiction to settle administrative 
disputes and disputes relevant to the execution of all its 
rulings. It shall have jurisdiction over disciplinary suits and 
appeals, and the exclusive jurisdiction to provide advice 
regarding legal issues to the administrative bodies 
determined by the law. It shall also review and draft bills and 
decrees of legislative nature, and shall review draft contracts 
to which the state or any other public authority is a party. The 
law shall determine its other jurisdictions. 
Article (190) 
The State Council is an autonomous judicial body, and it shall 
have the exclusive jurisdiction to settle administrative 
disputes and disputes relevant to the execution of all its 
rulings as well as the adjudication of disciplinary cases and 
appeals and decisions of disciplinary boards. It is the one 
concerned with giving opinions for the legal issues of the 
bodies determined by the law, revising the draft laws, the 
decisions that have a legislative character, the draft contracts 
which the law determines them and their values, and which 
the state or one of the public authorities is one of their parties. 
Article (193) Third paragraph 
The General Assembly of the Court shall elect its President 
from among the most senior three vice-presidents of the 
Court. It shall further choose the vice-presidents and the 
members of its Commissioners, and the appointment thereof 
shall be made by virtue of a decree by the President of the 
Republic. The foregoing shall be regulated by Law. 
Article (193) Third paragraph 
The President of the Republic shall choose the head of the 
Constitutional Court from among the five oldest deputy heads 
of the Court. The president of the Republic shall also appoint 
the deputy head of the Court from among two candidates, one 
of whom shall be nominated by the general assembly of the 
Court, while the head of the court shall nominate the other. 
The head of the board of commissioners and its members 
shall be appointed by a decision of the president of the 
republic based on the nomination of the head of the Court, 
and after consulting the general assembly of the court, all as 
prescribed by law. 
Article (200) First paragraph 
The Armed Forces belong to the People, and their duty is to 
protect the country, and preserve its security and the integrity 
of its territories. Only the State shall be entitled to establish 
the Armed Forces. No individual, organization, entity, or 
group shall be allowed to create military or quasi-military 
squadrons, groups or organizations. 
Article (200) First paragraph 
The Armed Forces belong to the People, and their duty is to 
protect the country, preserve its security and the integrity of 
its territories and maintain the Constitution, democracy, the 
basic of civil state, as well as the people's gains, rights and 
freedoms. Only the State shall be entitled to establish the 
Armed Forces. No individual, organization, entity, or group 
shall be allowed to create military or quasi-military 
squadrons, groups or organizations. 
Article (204) Second paragraph 
No civilian shall face trial before the Military Court, except 
for crimes that constitute a direct assault against military 
facilities or camps of the Armed Forces, or their equivalents, 
against military zones or border zones determined as military 
zones, against the Armed Forces’ equipment, vehicles, 
weapons, ammunition, documents, military secrets, or its 
public funds, or against military factories; crimes pertaining 
to military service; or crimes that constitute a direct assault 
against the officers or personnel of the Armed Forces by 
reason of performing their duties. 
Article (204) Second paragraph 
No civilian shall face trial before the Military Court, except 
for crimes that constitute an assault against military facilities 
or camps of the Armed Forces, or their equivalents, or 
facilities that are protected by the Armed Forces, against 
military zones or border zones determined as military zones, 
against the Armed Forces’ equipment, vehicles, weapons, 
ammunition, documents, military secrets, or its public funds, 
or against military factories; crimes pertaining to military 
service; or crimes that constitute a direct assault against the 
officers or personnel of the Armed Forces by reason of 
performing their duties. 
Article (234) 
The Minister of Defense shall be appointed upon the approval 
of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. The provisions 
of this article shall remain in force for two full presidential 
terms starting from the date on which this Constitution comes 
into effect. 
Article (234) 
The Minister of Defense shall be appointed upon the approval 
of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. 
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Article (243) 
The State shall endeavor that workers and farmers be 
appropriately represented in the first House of 
Representatives to be elected after this Constitution is 
approved, as regulated by law. 
Article (243) 
The State shall endeavor that workers and farmers be 
appropriately represented, as regulated by law. 
Article (244) 
The State shall endeavor that youth, Christians, persons with 
disability and Egyptians living abroad be appropriately 
represented in the first House of Representatives to be elected 
after this Constitution is approved, as regulated by law. 
Article (244) 
The State shall endeavor that youth, Christians, persons with 
disability and Egyptians living abroad be appropriately 
represented in the House of Representatives, as regulated by 
law.  
Article (248) Addendum 
The Senate is concerned with studying and proposing what it 
sees as a tool to consolidate democracy, support national 
unity, social peace, the basic values of society, supreme 
values, rights, freedoms and public duties, and deepen and 
expand the democratic system. 
 
Article (249) Addendum 
The opinion of the Senate shall be taken as follows: 
- Proposals for the amendment of one or more articles of the 
Constitution. 
- Projects concerning the general plan for Social and 
Economic Development 
- Treaties of reconciliation and alliance and all treaties 
relating to the rights of sovereignty. 
- Draft laws supplementing the Constitution and others 
referred to Senate by the President of the Republic. 
- What the President of the Republic refers to the Senate 
concerning the general policy of the State or its policy in Arab 
or foreign affairs. 
The Council shall give its opinion on these matters to the 
President of the Republic and the President of the Council of 
Representatives. 
 
Article (250) Addendum 
The Senate shall consist of a number of members determined 
by law, not less than 180 members. Two-thirds of the 
members of the Council shall be elected by direct secret 
universal suffrage. The President of the Republic shall 
appoint the remaining third and the elections shall be held in 
accordance with the law. 
 
Article (251) Addendum 
A candidate for membership in the Senate or the person who 
appoints him must be an Egyptian with civil and political 
rights. He must have at least a university degree or 
equivalent, and his age must be less than thirty-five years. 
The law specifies the conditions of candidacy, electoral 
system and the division of constituencies to take into account 
the equitable representation of the population and the 
governorates. Nomination can take place through single-
member election or multi-member election, or both together. 
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Article (252) Addendum 
The membership of the Senate and House of Representatives 
shall not be combined.   
Article (253) Addendum 
The Prime Minister, his deputies, ministers and other 
members of the government are not accountable to the 
Senate.  
Article (254) Addendum 
The provisions of the Constitution shall apply to the Senate 
in articles 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 
114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 1, 2, 132, 133, 136 and 
137, in a manner not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
section, provided that the specializations in the said articles 
shall be exercised by the Senate and its President. 
 
Delete Article 
Titles of chapters one and two of Part VI of the Constitution 
shall be deleted. 
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